Statute of Frauds and Business Norms: A Testable Game-Theoretic Model by Johnston, Jason Scott
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND BUSINESS NORMS:
A TESTABLE GAME-THEORETIC MODEL
JASON SCOTr JOHNSTON t
INTRODUCTION
This Article uses models drawn from the theory of repeated
games and evolutionary game theory to analyze the relationship
between contract law and business norms. This relationship is
central to modern, post-legal Realist contract and commercial law.
To borrow from Grant Gilmore, one of the fundamental tenets
underlying the Uniform Commercial Code ("Code") is that
commercial legislation ought "to clarify the law about business
transactions rather than to change the habits of the business
community," to be "accurate and not to be original."1 On this view,
Article 2 of the Code does not provide judges with a set of rules,
but instead directs them to find the law through "directed explora-
tion of the 'fact-pattern of common life.'"2  For the most part,
Article 2 utilizes flexible standards such as commercial reasonable-
ness and good faith which, at least in theory, allow judges "to
reduce the gap between law and practice and to insure that
decisions are practical and responsive to the needs, proven in the
particular case, of the parties and the relevant business commu-
nity."a Thus, while the Code itself does not and cannot provide
actual data on business practices,4 it nonetheless tells judges to
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attempt to mirror those practices or norms in resolving the disputes
that come before them.
Multiple generations of legal scholars have now had an opportu-
nity to analyze, interpret, criticize, and discuss Article 2. If one had
no prior knowledge of the conventions and practices of legal
scholarship,5 one might well have anticipated that the first thing
such scholars would have done would have been to initiate empirical
investigation into actual business practices. One might also have
expected to see more theoretical work exploring Article 2's
underlying assumptions. It is, for instance, far from clear that the
legal fact-finding process is such that judges will be accurate in
determining actual commercial norms from the evidence presented
to them in litigated disputes. After all, by the very fact that they are
not settled, disputes that end up in protracted litigation and a
reported decision are different in some way from the typical
dispute. Given the limitations that might be expected to confront
judges who try to discern actual commercial norms from the
evidence presented in litigated disputes, one might expect to see
rather extensive analysis of Article 2's fundamental underlying
principle, which is that judges should attempt to make contract law
mirror the norms immanent in everyday commercial life.
The existing body of commercial scholarship frustrates these
expectations. There are some studies that attempt to discern
actual commercial practice, typically through surveys of business
people and lawyers concerned with contract administration.
6
Indeed, one of the most famous and oft-cited contracts articles of
this century, Stewart Macaulay's Non-Contractual Relations in
Business,' reports the results of such a survey. But without excep-
tion, these surveys ask open-ended questions regarding what
business people do and whether they know about or are influenced
5 See Edward L. Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L.
REV. 1835 (1988) (stating that standard legal scholarship adopts a prescriptive
approach, is grounded on normative positions, and is expressed injudicial discourse).
6 See e.g., Hugh Beale & Tony Dugdale, Contacts Between Businessmen: Planning
and the Use of Contractual Remedies, 2 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'Y 45 (1975); Russell J.
Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and Policy, 1992 WiS. L. REV. 1, 1 (discussing
the results of a questionnaire sent to general counsel of a group of United States
companies); James J. White, Contract Law in Modem Commercial Transactions, An
Artifact of Twentieth Century Business Life?, 22 WASHBURN LJ. 1, 2 (1982) (interviewing
"thirty people at ten chemical and pharmaceutical companies during the summer of
1977" to understand the trade practice in that industry).
' Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
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by contract law in making their decisions. They do not theorize
about when contract law might be important to business people and
when it might not. They do not attempt to fashion sensible
questions based on an empirically based background picture of the
industry they study, but instead begin with presuppositions
regarding practices that are based on the facts of reported deci-
sions. Respondents in construction industry surveys,' for instance,
are asked about bidding practices but never asked how often they
actually bid jobs. Moreover, all types of construction are lumped
together in these surveys, with no distinction drawn, for instance,
between government contract jobs and those in the home-building
trade. Chemical industry respondents are asked how they deal
with allocation in times of shortage, but there is no attempt to
correlate their responses with data on contract structure or other
characteristics of the relationship that might allow a pattern to
emerge.
9
Still, despite their shortcomings, these survey-based studies are
to be praised for at least attempting to provide some evidence
regarding actual business practices. What is most remarkable about
the body of commercial law scholarship is the paucity of studies that
even attempt to find out what business people do. What do appear
with great frequency in this literature are law review articles
exploring the application of various Code provisions in reported
decisions.1" Such work has generated a number of folk beliefs
regarding the performance of certain Code sections. It is, for
instance, now taken for granted that many reported decisions
involving the Statute of Frauds depict judges torturing the Statute
to find that it does not apply.' Largely on this basis, elimination
' See Franklin M. Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practice in the
Construction Industy, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 237, 256-74 (1952) (investigating the
construction industry "firm offer" problem through an attitude survey of general
contractors and subcontractors in Indiana); Note, AnotherLook at Construction Bidding
and Contracts at Formation, 53 VA. L. REV. 1720, 1731-44 (1967) (examining the
practices of over 100 general and subcontractors). Somewhat better methodology is
employed in Richard Lewis, Contracts Between Businessmen: Reform of the Law of Firm
Offers and an Empirical Study of Tendering Practices in the Building Industry, 9 J.L. &
Soc'Y 153, 160 (1982) (surveying by questionnaire the views of a general contractor
and 11 subcontractors operating in the Cardiff area).
' See White, supra note 6, at 16 (stating that "[o]nly the prospect of a large pay off
would justify the expense necessary to prove such [a pattern]").
10 See e.g., Fairfax LearyJr. & David Frisch, Is Revision Duefor Article 2?, 31 VILL.
L. REV. 399 (1986).
11 See ARTICLE 2 PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 51.
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of the Code's Statute of Frauds (section 2-201) was supported by a
majority of the Article 2 study commission.1" Similarly, the large
number and great variety of reported decisions involving the Code's
proposed solution to the so-called "battle of the forms" (section
2-207) are taken as a clear indication that the section is a failure and
that it ought to be reformed to look more like the Code as a
whole.'
3
It may be that some of these folk beliefs happen to correspond
to actual problems in the application of various Code provisions.
But the beliefs themselves can be nothing more than reactions to
reported decisions, and they cannot possibly purport to say anything
about the larger universe of cases involving application of the
contested provisions without a theory of how the disputes that end
up in reported decisions relate to the universe of disputes. While
some commentators, such as James J. White, do theorize in a
general way about how reported decisions are unrepresentative, 4
they do not attempt to actually sharpen their general theories into
more concrete and precise hypotheses regarding which sorts of
disputes ought to be observed in reported decisions and what their
appearance says about the larger universe.
Given what is in the literature, it is perhaps needless to note the
complete absence of any studies systematically questioning the
Code's underlying assumption that the law ought to mirror
commercial norms. But this supposition generates an enormous set
of interesting and unexplored questions: How might judicial
misapprehension of norms affect the process by which norms evolve
and are maintained in a large commercial community? Is it really
appropriate to apply norms that evolve in the context of ongoing
relationships-relationships governed primarily by extralegal
sanctions-to the resolution of litigated disputes that the parties by
definition did not anticipate? And what can be learned from
disputes that are litigated to a reported decision? Can a hypothesis
be generated that will both explain such disputes and say something
useful about the desirability of trying to find commercial norms by
which such disputes ought to be resolved?
12 See id.
13 See James J. White, Promise Fulfilled and Principle Betrayed, 1990 ANN. SURVEY
AM. L. 7; John E. Murray, Jr., The Chaos of the "Battle of the Forms".• Solutions, 39
VAND. L. REV. 1307, 1308-09 (1986) (stating that both courts and commentators
believe that § 2-207 of the Code needs to be redrafted).
" See James J. White, Evaluating Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Preliminary Empirical Expedition, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1262, 1263 (1977).
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This Article addresses the latter set of issues-those that involve
how one might explain reported contract disputes and learn
something from those disputes about the norms that contract law is
designed to reflect. It does so by focusing on one norm in
particular, the use of a written contract. Section 2-201 of the
Uniform Commercial Code states the Statute of Frauds for contracts
involving the sale of goods. According to this section of the Code,
if such a contract involves the sale of goods exceeding $500 then it
must be in writing to be enforceable.15 For over one hundred
years, this statutory writing requirement has been criticized as
fundamentally at odds with business norms and as having no effect
on business behavior. In the words of one of the giants of the
common law, Justice Stephen, "[iun the great mass of cases the
contracting party is as unconscious of the existence of the Statute
of Frauds as of the pressure of the atmosphere."16 If Stephen is
right, then in the Statute of Frauds for the sale of goods we have an
example of dissonance between contract law and contract norm.
But even if Stephen has correctly identified an empirical phenome-
non-lots of parties disregarding the formality of a written contract
even when it is required for enforceability-there remains the job of
explanation and confirmation. That is, why do parties (at least
some) seem so indifferent to the formal requirements of the law and
the Statute of Frauds in particular? And how might one test such
an explanation?
In explaining why contracting parties are indifferent to the
Statute of Frauds's writing requirement, it does not suffice to avert
to a general lack of sophistication. Lack of sophistication may
explain why some parties fail to comply with the legal requirements
for enforceability, but the attack on the Statute of Frauds in the sale
of goods context is not so much that it is a trap for the unwary as
that it departs from the normal practice of sophisticated, legally
aware buyers and sellers. To explain this departure, one must
explain why such legally sophisticated contracting parties would care
so little about the requirements of legal enforceability.
The simplest explanation for such sophisticated indifference to
the law is that the parties have extralegal ways of enforcing their
agreements. More precisely, if the effectiveness of such extralegal
enforcement methods does not depend upon the existence of a
15 U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1978).
16James F. Stephen & Frederick Pollock, Section Seventeen of the Statute of Frauds,
1 LAw Q. REv. 1, 3 (1885).
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writing such as that required by the Statute of Frauds, then one
would expect that when the parties rely primarily on extralegal
enforcement they will not meet the writing requirement of the
Statute of Frauds. Conversely, in situations where the parties
anticipate legal enforcement at the time of contracting, one should
expect to see a written contract when required by the Statute of
Frauds. Put somewhat more broadly, one should expect to observe
a norm of relative informality-indifference to legal formalities-in
contract formation when extralegal rather than legal sanctions are
the primary means of anticipated contract enforcement.
It is not novelty that makes such a theory interesting. Indeed,
reliance on extralegal sanctions as the explanation for business
norms that depart from contract law requirements date back more
than fifty years, to some of Llewellyn's early writings." What
makes the theory worthwhile is that when refined, it has strong,
testable implications. The refinement consists primarily of a more
detailed explanation of when written contracts and other contrac-
tual formalities are likely to be unnecessary. This explanation draws
upon recent work in game theory and a substantial body of
empirical evidence on contemporary and historical contracting
practices. According to this account, parties will not likely resort to
detailed writings when transactions are relatively simple and when
the primary sanction for a perceived failure to perform is the
termination of the relationship. This hypothesis is more fully
developed below, but its derivation warrants a brief explanation
here. When the primary extralegal sanction is termination of the
relationship, a "second party" sanction rather than third party
sanctions such as boycotts or expulsion from a larger transactional
community, the requisite level of detail in contract memorialization
is determined solely by the parties' own need to observe and verify
performance."8 In relatively simple transactions, the parties them-
selves d9 not need detailed writings in order to observe and verify
performance. Hence only in complex transactions would one
expect to observe the use of relatively detailed written agreements
when the parties have an established relationship of trust, a unique
17 See, e.g., K. N. Llewellyn, Institutional Aspects of Contract, in 3 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 331 (Edwin R.A. Seligman ed., 1937).
" The legal implications of the economic distinction between observability and
verifiability were first fully explored by Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the
Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD.
271 (1992).
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advantage, or both. On the other hand, where the parties are
"strangers," in the sense that they lack any history of prior dealings,
they ought to have an ex ante expectation that legal enforcement
may well be necessary and this expectation should motivate them to
rationally comply with the Statute of Frauds's writing requirement,
even in transactions that are quite simple. Parties who rely upon
extralegal third party sanctions might be expected to have a need
for written memorialization that is intermediate between that of
those who rely upon second party sanctions and those who rely
upon legal sanctions. This hypothesis may be restated in somewhat
more precise terms: In transactions that are not overly complex,
the parties' history of prior dealings ought to be strongly predictive
of the existence and detail of the writings memorializing their
alleged contract. Where the parties have had a history of prior
dealings, they ought to be less concerned with legal formalities ex
ante, and one ought to observe few if any detailed writings
memorializing the alleged contract. Conversely, where there is no
evidence of prior dealings between the parties, one ought to observe
plenty of quite detailed writings. For complex transactions,
this relationship breaks down, in that detailed writings may be
rationally used to memorialize complex agreements even when the
parties do not expect to rely upon legal enforcement in the event of
disagreement.
The ideal way to test this hypothesis would be to observe a large
number of actual deals and to code these for the variables-the
duration and structure of the parties' relationship, the likely
effectiveness of third party nonlegal sanctions in their business
community, and the complexity of their transaction-which the
theory predicts will be important in determining whether or not the
parties use written contracts that comply with the requirements of
the Statute of Frauds. Unfortunately, there are at present no data
from which to construct such a sample. As an admitted second
best, I have taken as my sample all reported opinions volumes 18
through 23 of the UCC Reporting Service Second that are digested
as involving section 2-201. After removing those opinions that do
not involve a live, litigated section 2-201 issue,19 twenty-five
opinions remained in the sample. I then coded these remaining
opinions as to the following variables: (1) evidence of a history of
" This aspect of the coding was tested for validity by having three research
assistants code for a "live, litigated section 2-201 issue." This measurement was, as
detailed in the Appendix, reasonably but not perfectly reliable.
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prior dealings and a prior business and/or social relationship
between the parties; (2) the complexity of the agreement disputed
in the case; (3) the existence and level of detail of the writings
memorializing the alleged agreement; (4) the type and importance
of the Statute of Frauds issue that was discussed in the opinion; and
(5) evidence that the dispute reported was part of an "endgame"
situation involving the termination of the parties' relationship (if
one existed).
Most of the coded variables are those that the central hypotheses
set out as explanatory. Whether the dispute is part of an
"endgame" scenario is important for a related but different reason.
The theory of extralegal sanctions sketched above and developed in
more detail below says that an established relationship between the
parties is likely to indicate both that they do not expect disputes to
arise very often, and that they expect disputes to be resolved
successfully when they do arise. That is, a (credible) second party
sanction of terminating the relationship is expected to induce each
side to seek to resolve whatever disputes do arise. Thus a fairly
direct implication of this theory of credible extralegal, second-party
sanctions is that litigation over alleged breach-and, a fortiori,
reported opinions-would be observed between parties with an
established relationship only when that relationship has terminated.
Coded in this way, the sample provides the basis for two sorts
of empirical tests. One is informal and involves a simple counting
and correlation between, for example, the existence and detail of
the writings in the case and evidence of a prior relationship between
the parties. The other sort of test is econometric, and involves
regressing the dependent variable-the existence and level of detail
of the writings-against the key explanatory variables-transactional
complexity and evidence of a prior relationship.
There are, of course, a number of difficulties that beset both
sorts of tests. The sample used here is relatively small, making any
statistical test relatively weak in terms of its power." This short-
coming acknowledged, however, it is nonetheless possible to make
statements regarding statistical significance. Perhaps more funda-
20 Here, power refers to the ability of the test to distinguish the hypothesis tested
from the alternative (for instance, that evidence of a prior relationship does not
predict the existence and detail of the writings), and in more formal terms refers to
the sum of the probabilities of type I and type II errors. For an introduction to this
notion, see H.D. BRUNK, AN INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 340-43 (3d
ed. 1975); PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICs 70 (3d ed. 1992).
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mentally, a sample of contracting scenarios drawn from reported
opinions may be systematically unrepresentative of the larger
universe of contracts because of the selection bias in disputes that
end in litigation and a reported decision.21 It is, however, possible
to develop scenarios regarding the type of selection bias that may
be present in reported decisions and to examine the logical
relationship between particular inferences drawn from such a
sample and the nature of the bias in the sample. To the extent that
the logical validity of the inferences are unaffected by the bias, the
sample evidence is robust with respect to sample selection bias.
Thus, even with a relatively small sample of reported decisions, it is
still possible to find statistically significant results, and results that
are robust with respect to the likely direction of selection bias.
In the sense of generating significant and robust implications,
the sample evidence provides strong support for my theory of when
business practice dictates the written memorialization of agreements
and compliance with the Statute of Frauds. In addition, it provides
some perhaps rather surprising evidence that judges are applying
the Statute in a predictable way that tends to make statutory
requirements mirror business practice. As for the theory of
business norms regarding written agreements when required by the
Statute of Frauds, perhaps the most striking finding is that in over
fifty percent of the cases in my sample involving parties with a prior
relationship (five of nine), the parties did not have written agree-
ments.22 By contrast, in only approximately seven percent (6.6%)
of the cases involving "strangers" (one out of fifteen) did the parties
fail to have a writing, and the single "stranger" case where the
parties failed to have a writing was an art sale that was brokered by
merchants whose own close and continuing business relations may
have made second party sanctions the anticipated enforcement
mechanism. The explanatory importance of the status of the
parties' prior relationship is, moreover, strongly supported by the
2 In the literature to date, the dominant theoretical account of such bias is that
given by George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). This model of selection bias has been confirmed by some
empirical tests. See Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The Selection of
Employment Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest-Klein
Hypothesis, 24J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1995);Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothesis and
the Relationship Between Trial and Plaintiff Vitory, 103J. POL. EcON. 229 (1995).
22 The data on case coding are set out in detail in the Appendix, and some
individual cases are discussed in the text. See infra notes 104-22 and accompanying
text.
1867
1868 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1859
statistical insignificance of transactional complexity explanatory
variables in the regression analysis.
The sample data also suggest that judges are applying the
Statute of Frauds in a predictable fashion that closely mirrors
business practice. In every one of the five cases that involved parties
with a prior relationship and no written contract, the court either
found a statutory exception to the writing requirement or found
that the Statute did not apply. By contrast, in all but one of the
"stranger" cases, (where the merchant exception was invoked to
avoid a finding of insufficient writings) the courts found that the
Statute of Frauds applied and determined statutory sufficiency in a
way that was true to business practice in such settings; that is, the
courts rejected arguments that the writings were insufficient when
such arguments were formalistic attempts to avoid rather obvious
agreements, but accepted insufficiency arguments when the failure
to comply with the statutory requirements (such as signing)
indicated that no deal had been reached.
These findings suggest that the recent debate over abolition
of the Statute of Frauds is based on a serious misconception of
what the reported decisions imply about the larger universe of
agreements. The evidence presented here tends to indicate that
courts are applying the Statute in a highly predictable way that is
consistent with underlying norms. Courts recognize norms of
informality in established relationships and find exceptions to the
statutory writing requirement. In "stranger" relationships where
formalities were observed because litigation was an expected
response to future disagreement, the courts in my sample both
respect the writing requirement and dispose quickly of marginal
arguments that the writing was insufficient. As Posner points
out, the normative significance of these results is rather complex.
23
Still my results caution that abolishing the Statute because it does
not matter in continuing relationships with repeat dealings might
provide little or no benefit in such settings while harming the
certainty of one-shot, non-repeat transactions, where parties use
written contracts for precisely the reasons that motivated Parlia-
ment to enact the first Statute of Frauds over three hundred years
ago.
" See Eric A. Posner, Norms, Formalities, and the Statute of Frauds: A Comment, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 1971, 1971-72 (1996).
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I. THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS PROBLEM
The Statute of Frauds sets up a formal requirement for contract
enforceability. The Article 2 Statute of Frauds, section 2-201, states
that contracts for the sale of goods exceeding $500 are enforceable
only if there is "some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract
for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party
against whom enforcement is sought."24 There are three general
exceptions to this requirement of a signed writing and one
exception that applies only to merchants. The general exceptions
are for (1) contracts involving specially manufactured goods;25 (2)
admissions in court of the existence of a contract;28 and (3)
partially performed contracts. 27 A special exception for merchants
provides that an oral contract between merchants is enforceable
when it is confirmed in a writing signed by the sender and when the
recipient has knowledge of and fails to object to the signed
confirmation. 8
Commentators who have looked closely at the drafting history
of section 2-201 agree that its final form reflects Karl Llewellyn's
rather complex understanding of the role of written formalities in
contract enforcement. On the one hand, Llewellyn was well aware
of the criticism of the Statute of Frauds as found in the 1906
Uniform Sales Act.29 Under the Sales Act, enforceability required
a signed note or memorandum that stated "with reasonable
certainty all the essential elements of the transaction."30 By the
24 U.C.C. § 2-201(1) (1978).
' Section 2-201(3)(a) provides an exception to the § 2-201(1) writing requirement
if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not
suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business and
the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances
which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made either
a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their
procurement.
Id. § 2-201(3)(a).
2 
6 See id. § 2-201(3)(b).
- See id. § 2-201(3)(c). Comment 2 to § 2-201 clarifies that "'[p]artial perfor-
mance' as a substitute for the required memorandum can validate the contract only
for the goods which have been accepted or for which payment has been made and
accepted." Id. § 2-201 cmt. 2.28 See id. § 2-201(2).
21940 UNIF. AcT § 13(1). To examine the text of the statute, see UNIF. SALES
AcT § 4, 1 U.L.A. 71 (1922).
so 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW
AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT § 102 (3d ed. 1948).
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time Llewellyn began drafting section 2-201, critics had widely
challenged this requirement as a formality that failed to reflect
business practice.3" The requirement did not prevent fraudulent
assertions that a contract existed when one did not, but rather
facilitated fraudulent denials of oral deals.3 2 Llewellyn acknowl-
edged these criticisms and the possibility of doing without a Statute
of Frauds (as many states, England, and continental Europe have
done).3' He nonetheless felt that the right sort of formal writing
requirement would both validate and encourage good business
practice. Llewellyn relaxed the requirement that the writing set out
"all the essential elements of the transaction," but still maintained
a writing requirement. In so doing, he attempted to eliminate the
Statute as an instrument of fraud while adding "'both the desire and
a reasonable machinery for a businessman to be able to rely on what
both parties sign and on the fact that he has procured a memoran-
dum signed by the other party.'" 4 Similarly, in creating the
merchant exception for written confirmations, Llewellyn sought to
reward and encourage what he found to be the better business
practice: "the general indirect effect of the statute, in urging men
to get their deals into writing, is highly salutary; and ... the practice
of 'confirming' oral or telephone deals is today so ingrained that the
statute no longer costs the price in occasional hardship which it cost
a century ago."
35
In arguing for the Code's adoption, Corbin nonetheless criticized the idea of
retaining the Statute of Frauds on the ground that "from the very first, the
requirement of a signed writing has been at odds with the established habits of men,
a habit of reliance upon the spoken word in increasing millions of cases." Arthur L.
Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE LJ. 821,
829 (1950).
2 See Zipporah B. Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant
Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465, 518 & n.232 (1987) (discussing commentary which
criticized the Statute of Frauds as promoting, rather than preventing, "reneging" on
oral contracts). The Statute of Frauds was enacted in England in 1676, with the goal
of preventing fraudulent assertions that contracts had been made. See id. at 517 &
n.231.
" See Ingrid M. Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn's Attempt to
Achieve the Good, the True, the Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. LJ. 1141, 1154-55
(1985) (citing Llewellyn, Memorandum Replying to the Report and Memorandum of
Task Group 1 of the Special Committee of the Commerce and Industry Association
of New York, Inc. on the Uniform Commercial Code (August 16, 1954), reprinted in
1 STATE OF NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMITTrEE REPORT, HEARINGS ON THE UNIF.
COMMERCIAL CODE 109 (1954) [hereinafter N.Y. LAW REVISION REPORT]).
34 Id. at 1156 (quoting N.Y. LAW REVISION REPORT, supra note 33, at 109).
'- Wiseman, supra note 32, at 518 (quoting REVISED UNIF. SALES ACT § 4 cmt. 3
(Report and Second Draft 1941)).
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There is, then, a good deal of evidence to suggest that section
2-201 emerged from Llewellyn's own calculus of the costs and
benefits of a formal writing requirement. On this view, a writing
requirement reflected and rewarded better business practice and
encouraged others to adopt the norm of written memorialization.
The cost of the writing requirement was in the use of the Statute to
dishonestly avoid an actual deal. This cost Llewellyn attempted to
minimize by requiring only "some writing." And he thought the
cost likely to be small and decreasing because '"the whole practice
of all intelligent business is to confirm in detail or make careful
written contracts so that the number of cases in which defective
memos will actually come into operation not only is almost
nugatory, but is decreasing by the minute. 36
As a relatively explicit cost-benefit policymaking effort, commen-
tators have generally viewed section 2-201 as a deviation from the
general Article 2 philosophy of reflecting business practice. Ingrid
Hillinger argues that "[r]ather than paying homage to actual mer-
cantile practice, section 2-201 ... codified what Llewellyn thought
should be the law regarding commercial transactions. "-" Zipporah
Wiseman believes that section 2-201 manifests Llewellyn's "norma-
tive vision of merchant reality,""8 and contends that even if the
Statute properly balances the costs and benefits of a writing
requirement in the merchant exception, "such an argument provides
no basis for imposing similar duties, and tolerating potentially
greater injustices, in the nonmerchant arena." 9 When commenta-
tors have looked closely, they have found that the conceptual
underpinnings of section 2-201 are shakier than Llewellyn thought.
Evaluation of section 2-201's performance has tended to be
equally critical. Noting the considerable litigation, controversy, and
commentary generated by section 2-201, the Study Group recently
engaged to report on the Revision of Article 2 found "no persuasive
evidence either that the statute of frauds has prevented fraud in the
proof of the making of a contract or that its presence has channeled
behavior toward more reliable forms of record keeping."40 The
study did find that repeal of the Statute in England had occurred
' See Hillinger, supra note 33, at 1155 n.88 (quoting N.Y. LAW REVISION REPORT,
supra note 33, at 164).
'3 Id. at 1155.
S8 Wiseman, supra note 32, at 518.39 Id. at 519.
40 ARTICLE 2 PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 3, at 50.
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with little if any subsequent discussion or reports regarding
the impact of the repeal." It also called attention to the many
reported opinions in which courts were clearly "straining to avoid
the statute when it [was] clear that some agreement existed,"
although there was no writing.4 2 Despite reiterating the "lack of
evidence" regarding the behavioral effects of the Statute, the
available evidence from litigated cases and the English experience
"persuaded most" of the Study Group that "§ 2-201 should go."4"
Debate over the desirability of a statutory writing requirement
for contracts involving the sale of goods began long before Karl
Llewellyn's appearance on the historical scene. Writing in 1885,
Justice Stephen criticized the English statutory writing requirement
for the sale of goods as arbitrary, out of step with business practice,
and ineffective in changing such practice.4 4 Stephen argued that
"the power of the law to control conduct is small, and is constantly
exaggerated," and that since "custom," and not law, regulates the
"great mass of human transactions .... Laws ought to be adjusted
to the habits of society, and not to aim at remoulding them."45
These criticisms, of course, are precisely the same sorts of argu-
ments made against the Statute of Frauds as found in section 2-201.
Moreover, from Stephen's time until now, the argument that the
Statute of Frauds is maladapted to business practice has been
grounded in large part on commentators' adverse reaction to
"strained" opinions that strive to avoid the Statute. But how, one
might ask, are such opinions to be understood without an underly-
ing theory of how business practice evolves and how business
practice is reflected in reported opinions? The next Part of this
Article begins the task of building and testing such a theory.
II. THEORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BUSINESS PRACTICE
AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS'S WRITING REQUIREMENT
As the preceding Part has shown, traditional normative criticism
of the Statute of Frauds for the sale of goods has rested on two
positive or descriptive assertions. The first of these is that the
statutory writing requirement deviates from common business
practice or norm and is moreover ineffective in altering business
41 See id. at 51.
42 Id. at 53
43 id.
44 See Stephen & Pollock, supra note 16, at 5-6.
45 Id.
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practice. The second, related assertion, is that reported opinions in
which judges struggle to avoid application of the Statute are good
evidence not only of the difference between statutory command and
business norm but also evidence that such deviation generates
precisely the sort of unpredictability and uncertainty regarding the
legal effect of a writing that the Statute was supposed to eliminate.
Drawing on both recent results in game theory and accumulated
empirical evidence, this Part explores the positive assertions
underlying the normative critique of the Statute of Frauds. In so
doing, it constructs a two-part theory. The first part of the theory
explains that when contracting parties rely on extralegal enforce-
ment rather than legal enforcement, they will use writings only if
writings are required by their own need to verify complex perfor-
mance obligations. The second part of the theory explains why it
may nonetheless be rational for the parties to litigate when their
relationship ends and how reported opinions describing such
litigation may be used to test the theory of rational non-compliance
with the statutory writing requirement.
A. Complying with the Statute of Frauds: A Game
Theoretic Explanation
This Article endeavors to examine and explain-within the
context of the Statute of Frauds-when parties use relatively detailed
formal writings to make their contracts and when they do not.
Rather than building such a theory deductively-within a relatively
formal, mathematical model-I will proceed inductively, drawing
rather precise, testable hypotheses regarding compliance with the
Statute of Frauds from both contemporary and historical evidence
regarding written formality in contract formation. These hypothe-
ses emerge when the empirical evidence is interpreted in the light
of game-theoretic insights that explain why it may sometimes be
rational for contracting parties to rely on extralegal versus legal
sanctions for nonperformance.
In interpreting evidence on the use of detailed writings in
contract formation, it is important first to distinguish between legal
and extralegal reasons for using a writing. As a piece of the formal
machinery of contract enforcement, a statutory writing requirement
itself can affect only the behavior of those parties Who contract with
an ex ante awareness of the likely need for ex post legal enforce-
ment of their deal. Within the complementary universe of those
who contract without thinking about what is required to ensure ex
1873
1874 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1859
post legal enforcement, detailed writings may still be used, but their
use by definition will not be motivated by what the Statute of Frauds
might happen to require. Rather, for contracts that are expected to
be enforced extralegally, the existence and detail of the written
contract ought to be determined by the functional requirements of
effective extralegal enforcement. Any theory that would account for
observations on the existence and detail of written contracts must
therefore provide an account of how written contracts facilitate
effective extralegal enforcement.
Explaining how writings facilitate extralegal enforcement
requires some theory of the mechanisms of extralegal enforcement.
In its broadest outline, such a theory is well-known and is grounded
on the notion, in some settings, that there exist effective extralegal
sanctions for contract breach. As aptly summarized in a recent
article by David Charny, an extralegal sanction generally takes the
form of a benefit that acts as a bond which will be lost upon breach
of a contractual obligation.4 6 In close and continuing relation-
ships, a primary extralegal sanction is the threat to terminate the
relationship, causing the breaching party to lose expected future
relationship-specific advantages. Moreover, to the extent that the
parties' economic or commercial relationship is embedded within
a concrete and ongoing personal relationship between them and a
similar structure of such relationships within the relevant commu-
nity, it becomes "overlaid with social content" so that breaching
would cause the breacher to suffer a direct psychological cost (in
the form of regret, self-disappointment, and mortification) even if
the breach were never discovered." Within suitably dense and
46 See David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L.
REv. 373, 392-93 (1990) ("The nonlegal sanction for breach of a commitment is the
sacrifice of something valuable to the breaching party .... ").
47 The existence of such internalized sanctions for malfeasance that arise out of
continuing relations has been stressed perhaps most prominently by Mark
Granovetter. See Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem
of Embeddedness, 91 AM.J. Soc. 481, 490 (1985) (arguing that personal relations and
networks of such relations generate trust and discourage malfeasance); Mark
Granovetter, Problems of Explanation in Economic Sociology, in NETWORKS AND
ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURE, FORM, AND ACTION 25, 41-42 (Nitin Nohria & Robert
G. Eccles eds., 1992) (proposing three extralegal reasons why "individuals might act
in economic transactions as they are supposed to": social or economic interest, moral
compulsion, and normalized expectations between transacting partners). In a game-
theoretic context, Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without Law: A Theory
of SocialNorms and Organizational Cultures, 10J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 390 (1994),
have shown that cooperative outcomes may be sustained in static large society games
when the internalized cost of cheating varies negatively with the perceived frequency
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homogeneous communities, the harm to the breacher's reputation
and lost future dealings with third parties that she will suffer
when the aggrieved party tells others in the community about her
breach may supplant the "second party" sanction of relationship
termination.
Recent work in formal (that is, mathematical) game theory pro-
vides a rather general confirmation for these hypotheses regarding
circumstances under which second and third party extralegal
sanctions are likely to be effective. As for the sanction of terminat-
ing the relationship, it has been shown that when two parties have
a sufficiently high probability of continuing their relationship and
neither is too impatient, then cooperative behavior in each round
they play may emerge as an equilibrium due to the credible threat
to "cheat," or behave opportunistically (once or forever) if the other
fails to cooperate. 4 The force of reputational or third party
sanctions has been generally confirmed by the demonstration that
if "cheaters" are labelled as such within a sufficiently small commu-
nity, then a community norm of cooperation may emerge as an
equilibrium due to the credible threat of each member to forever
punish cheaters with cheating whenever they are encountered.
49
of cheating in the society.
41 It should be noted that this cooperative outcome in long-term relationships is
by no means the unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium. For a reasonably accessible
discussion, see ERIC VAN DAMME, STABILITY AND PERFECTION OF NASH EQUILIBRIA
187-95 (2d ed. 1991). More strongly, such sanctioning can be shown to support
cooperation as the unique evolutionary outcome. For evolutionary approaches to this
result, see generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984);
Robert Axelrod, An Evolutionay Approach to Norms, 80 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 1095 (1986)
(discussing the power of highly evolved social norms in fostering cooperation). See
also ArthurJ. Robson, Efficiency in Evolutionary Games: Darwin, Nash, and the Secret
Handshake, 144J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 379, 379 (1990) (arguing that, in the case
of the repeated prisoner's dilemma, an "evolution of co-operation" is ultimately
inevitable).
'9 The general approach has been to embed repeated two party interactions within
a stylized "social" or commercial framework in which members of the relevant society
can identify and punish those who have failed to cooperate in a previous encounter
with a different member of the society. The problem then is to identify circumstanc-
es under which the third party punishments are credible in the sense of subgame
perfection. There are variations in the type of game studied, and these variations are
important in explaining the viability of alternative third party sanctions as subgame
perfect. SeeJonathan Bendor & Dilip Mookherjee, Norms, Third-Party Sanctions, and
Cooperation, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 33 (1990) (presenting a game-theoretic
analysis of the role of third party sanctions in facilitating cooperation); Avner Greif,
Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The Maghribi Traders'
Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 525 (1993) (describing an economic institution which
governed relationships between medieval European merchants as having successfully
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One of the most important implications of this recent game-
theoretic work is that the effectiveness of extralegal sanctions for
noncooperative behavior does not necessarily depend upon the
existence of sunk costs or relationship-specific benefits. As the
need for such sunk costs or benefits is a foundational tenet of the
competing, transaction cost approach developed by Williamsone'
and a primary criticism of Eric Posner,5 it is worth explaining
what game theory has to say about the role of sunk costs and
benefits. Consider first the viability of second party sanctions.
Generically, such sanctions take the form of noncooperative
behavior that lowers future payoffs to the sanctioned party. One
sort of noncooperative behavior-"cheating"-is fully effective and,
in fact, depends upon the continuation of the relationship. It is
precisely when the parties trust each other and think that they are
likely to continue doing business that the threat of doing less than
one has in the past (a kind of "cheating") is likely to be most
effective. By the same token, severe shortfalls from expectations
within the relationship may cause the aggrieved party to credibly 2
threaten to terminate the relationship. The credibility of this threat
hinges on the existence of a more profitable alternative relationship
to which the threatening party might turn; its bite depends upon the
difficulty that the threatened party would have in finding a
comparable alternative relationship. While this is not the place for
a more elaborate formal demonstration," these conditions for
effective second party sanctions do not require anything like sunk
acted as a substitute for community between the traders and maintaining a sense of
cooperation); cf. Glenn Ellison, Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous
Random Matching, 61 REV. ECON. STUD. 567, 568 (1994) (discussing how "contagious"
punishments maintain cooperation in a large society despite informational
restrictions); Michihiro Kandori, Social Norms and Community Enforcement, 59 REV.
ECON. STUD. 63,66-68 (1992) (demonstrating the existence of an equilibrium in which
cooperation is sustained through contagious punishment).
50 See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM
(1985). See, however, recent experimental work, reported in Steven C. Hackett, Is
Relational Exchange Possible in the Absence of Reputations and Repeated Contract, 10J.L.
ECON. & ORGANIZATION 360 (1994), which suggests that distributional norms may
constrain contract bargaining even when parties are anonymous.
5 See Posner, supra note 23.
12 Here, credibility is used in the sense of subgame perfection, meaning that the
party would actually carry out the threat were the game to reach that stage. For an
introduction to this game-theoretic notion of credibility, see KEN BINMORE, FUN AND
GAMES: A TEXT ON GAME THEORY 46-51 (1992).
SeeJason S.Johnston, Extralegal Contractual Enforcement: Some Theoretical
Results (May 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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costs or benefits as interpreted by transaction cost theory. To the
contrary, credible threats to terminate the relationship or degrade
one's future performance within it in fact hinge on an asymmetry
of commitment, and such an asymmetry may arise solely from
informational asymmetries regarding market opportunities.
From this analysis, it follows quite directly that the viability of
second party sanctions does not depend upon the existence of the
sort of densely knit merchant or social community supposed by
Ellickson 4 and studied more recently by my colleague Eric
Posner.55 Such a community may be necessary to sustain extralegal
third party sanctions.' But from the argument in the previous
paragraph, effective second party sanctions in fact depend upon the
existence of a good market or community alternative for the
sanctioning party. A dense community structure in which cheating
in one relationship may close off future possibilities will be inimical
to a credible threat to cheat within, or terminate, a two-party
relationship as a punishment when outsiders to the relationship
make errors in identifying who was responsible for its breakdown.
Indeed, third party sanctions substitute for, and weaken, second
party sanctions whenever outsiders have worse information about
performance within a relationship than those who are party to it.
57
Despite having all of these rather direct and important implica-
tions, the recent formal, game-theoretic work on credible extralegal
sanctions has not as yet focused on the interaction between legal
and extralegal sanctions; nor has it addressed the private institu-
tional requirements for effective extralegal enforcement of
contracts." This is also true of other less formal work-such as
that by Coleman, Ellickson, and Elster 9 -which has recently
5 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 177-82 (1991).
"See Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and
Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133 (1996); Posner, supra
note 23.
"This is an implication of the model developed by Kandori and extended by
Ellison. See supra note 49.
7SeeJohnston, supra note 53.
"For one prominent exception to this relative institutional neglect, see Paul R.
Milgrom et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Medieval Law
Merchan Private Judges, and the Champagne Fairs, 2 EcON. & POL. 1 (1990).
"For their respective contributions, see JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF
SOCIALTHEORY 119-321 (1990) (discussing social structures and how they are shaped
by legal and extralegal authority); ELLICKSON, supra note 54;JON ELsTER, THE CEMENT
OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER (1989);Jon Elster, Social Norms and Economic
Theory, J. ECON. PERP., Fall 1989, at 99, 100-15 (defining the many roles of social
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explored how systems of extralegal norms may emerge and persist
solely on the strength of extralegal sanctions. Still, the existing
literature does provide some hints as to how written contracts might
function in sustaining extralegal enforcement.
First, we should expect to find extralegal enforcement only
where the parties have a prior relationship, which makes possible
the second party sanctions of "cheating" or termination, or where
they are part of a relatively small, homogeneous community with
effective third party sanctions for breach, such as future third party
refusal to deal. The viability of extralegal enforcement, however,
does not by itself determine the need for a written contract and
such a contract's level of detail. Where third party enforcement is
the major extralegal sanction, breach must be verifiable by someone
who was not a party to, and in all likelihood did not observe
performance under, the contract. For if breach is not verifiable, a
system of third party enforcement that operates by punishing
breachers cannot operate accurately and effectively. Hence, unless
something in the nature of the contract makes breach obvious to
third parties, a system of extralegal third party enforcement will
require written contracts in order to be effective, with the level of
detail corresponding generally to the level of complexity of the
transaction.
By implication, it is only when the primary extralegal sanction
for breach arises out of the parties' own prior relationship that we
should expect to see the parties dispensing with a writing (or using
only a very sketchy, informal writing). As noted above, a prior
relationship between the parties creates two sorts of potential
extralegal sanctions. In one case, the credible threat to punish
breach by discontinuing or degrading the relationship upon the
detection of a breach effectively uses the possible continuation of
the relationship as a performance bond. In the other case, the
relationship of trust and mutual social dependence itself deters
breach by, in effect, internalizing the cost of breach. These cases
surely need not be distinct. In each, however, there is little or no
need to verify breach to others. Rather, breach is likely to be
directly observable by both parties, and the effectiveness of the
sanction for breach-termination of the relationship and the psychic
harm from behaving opportunistically and betraying trust-does not
hinge on the existence of a detailed written contract specifying the
norms and their place in promoting social and self interests).
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parties' rights and obligations. Effective second party sanctions for
breach would require such a written agreement only where the
transaction is so complex that the parties themselves might
otherwise err in measuring actual against promised performance.
B. Surveying the Evidence on Written Contracts and
the Statute of Frauds
These conjectures are merely the first step toward testable
hypotheses. The next step, undertaken in this section, is to enrich
the theory with what the existing empirical evidence has to say. The
only systematic, contemporary empirical evidence on how the
Statute of Frauds affects behavior is a 1957 student note which
surveyed 200 Connecticut manufacturers." The survey did not ask
the sort of questions which would directly illuminate the theoretical
conjectures developed above, but nonetheless provides plenty of
confirming evidence.
This survey found that medium-sized manufacturers surveyed
complied with the Statute of Frauds more than usual but less than
always, but that larger manufacturers tended to use writings almost
always, especially when demanding signed agreements from
customers. 61  Manufacturers were, on average, much less con-
cerned with obtaining written agreements from their suppliers and
were usually content with oral acknowledgments. On the other
hand, manufacturers would only rely upon an oral order from a
customer if they had had prior dealings with the customer.62 At
the same time, only ten percent of the manufacturers said that they
would, as a matter of practice, sue a customer who defaulted on an
order, while sixty-one percent would settle for expenses incurred.'
From these responses, the Note concludes that manufacturers seem
60 See Note, The Statute of Frauds and the Business Community: A Re-appraisal in
Light of Prevailing Practices, 66 YALE L.J. 1038 (1957).
61 See id. at 1047 n.20 (defining medium-sized employers as those with between
101-500 employees and large manufacturers as those with over 500 employees, the
survey found that 90% of medium-sized employers reported usingsigned memoranda
more often than not, and an even higher percentage of large manufacturers did the
same).
62 See id. at 1051, 1055 (noting that of 87 manufacturers who responded to the
survey, 65 would be willing to rely upon an oral customer order some of the time,
and 55 out of the 65 said they would do so only when they had had prior dealings
with the customer).
63 See id. at 1061 n.64 (finding that, for all sizes of manufacturers, settling for
expenses incurred by the cancellation of an order is the most popular option).
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to demand a writing not because they are concerned about legal
enforceability, but rather because they "deem it sound business
practice to have written records."6
This conclusion is appealing, in that one can well imagine that
a manufacturer would wish to have written memorials of its orders,
if only to ensure that the orders are timely met by producing goods
to the correct customer specifications. It is, moreover, understand-
able that the larger the manufacturer, the larger the number of
orders it may have and hence the greater the need for accurate and
complete written records. That a large, multifaceted, and complex
business has need of written records simply in order to carry on
business in an efficient manner seems unquestionable. But size
alone does not explain why manufacturers demand a writing when
dealing with customers but not when dealing with suppliers. Oddly,
the survey did not ask the respondents why they demanded a
writing in some dealings but not others. A very strong clue to this
pattern, however, is given by the fact that almost all of the manufac-
turers who said they sometimes would not demand a writing from
a customer would do so only when they had a continuing relation-
ship with the customer. 5 This response strongly suggests that
among the sample respondents, manufacturer-supplier relationships
were at this time typically close and continuing, whereas manufac-
turer-customer relationships were not. This suggestion raises the
hypothesis that writings were believed to be necessary only when
dealing with a new or non-repeat player. Even on this hypothesis,
the need for a writing when dealing with non-repeat players is not
clear. It may be that repeat customers have such well-understood
buying patterns that a single writing will suffice as a continuing
reminder of specifications and other requirements. On the other
hand, manufacturers may demand a written order from new or non-
repeat customers because they do not trust such customers.
Regardless of the explanation for lack of trust in non-repeat
relationships,66 it is at least plausible that such distrust would make
manufacturers anxious to ensure that the threat of a lawsuit for
breach is at least potentially viable.
6 Id. at 1064.
11 See id. at 1055 (noting that of the 65 manufacturers who said that they would
be willing to rely on an oral customer order some of the time, 55 said that they would
do so only if they had had at least occasional dealings with the customer).
'6 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text (noting the significant increase in
use of writings when the parties are "strangers").
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In defense of the Note's conclusion, it might be argued that the
need to ensure a viable lawsuit for breach is ruled out as an
explanation for the use of a writing in non-repeat manufacturer
relationships by the survey finding that only ten percent of the
manufacturers make it a practice to sue for buyer default. However,
this argument confuses two strategically distinct actions: suing "as
a matter of practice," and using the viable threat of a lawsuit as a
way to gain leverage in informal, extralegal settlement. The survey
evidence is completely consistent with a manufacturer strategy of
only occasionally suing defaulting customers in order to build a
reputation for toughness that will make future defaulters uncertain
enough about suit to take the threat seriously and settle on the
manufacturer's terms.67 Even if the manufacturer community were
dense enough so that information about a defaulting buyer would
quickly become known by other manufacturers, outright refusals to
deal with such a customer by other manufacturers seem a costly and
unlikely way of sanctioning buyer default, especially when the
circumstances causing the buyer's default-for example, a sudden
and unexpected exogenous change in demand for the buyer's
product-may make it more than likely that the buyer would
perform as promised under more normal circumstances.' It may
be that there are so many potential customers that any known
defaulter will be excluded in equilibrium, but a more likely outcome
is that such behavior will trigger the threat of a lawsuit. If this is
so, then it will be important for manufacturers to ensure that such
a threat is viable, and a written agreement may well be perceived to
improve the chances of viable suit.
Because it did not ask manufacturers why they required written
contracts in non-repeat transactions, the 1957 Note does not
present evidence allowing one to test the hypothesis that writings
6' This is the kind of reputation building under incomplete information when
facing a sequence of non-repeat players modelled by Kreps, Roberts, Milgrom, and
Wilson. See David M. Kreps et al., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated
Prisoners' Dilemma, 27J. ECON. THEORY 245 (1982) (demonstrating how reputation
effects can motivate cooperation between "strangers").
6' This is to argue that the sort of contagion equilibrium discovered by Kandori
and refined by Ellison is unlikely under incomplete information regarding the state
of nature that obtained for previous plays of the game. See supra note 49. Note that
it is not incomplete information about player type which destroys such equilibria, but
rather uncertainty regarding the prior realized state of nature that does so. If there
are states of nature in which the classical Prisoner's Dilemma cooperative outcome
is in fact Pareto inferior to non-cooperation (that is, no trade), then the game is
effectively not a Prisoner's Dilemma in some states.
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are used in interactions among non-repeat players in order to
ensure the viability of legal action. There is, however, a very large
body of historical evidence that tends strongly to confirm this
hypothesis. Perhaps the most detailed such evidence is found in
Bruce Mann's account of the changing patterns of debt litigation in
colonial Connecticut between the late seventeenth and mid-
eighteenth centuries. 9 Mann found that in the earlier years of this
period, debt litigation between both merchants and townsmen
consisted primarily of actions based on "book debt," which was a
very simple recording in merchants' or shopkeepers' books of
payments made and owed without any explicit promise to pay.
7 0
In suits based on "book debt," the books themselves "were not
conclusive evidence of the debts they recorded," and a broad range
of parol evidence was relevant, allowing inquiry into the full range
of relations between the litigants. 71 Mann argues that reliance on
the highly informal and incomplete record of agreement provided
by "book debt" was rational under social conditions in which
repeated and continuous interaction-whether among neighbors in
small, isolated towns or among merchants in larger towns-
generated strong ties of interdependence and trust.72 The range
of evidence considered in "book debt" suits was appropriate to the
ultimate goal of such suits, which was to air the whole context of the
parties' social relations and thereby reconcile neighbors who had no
option but to continue to deal with one another.7 1 In the first half
of the eighteenth century, however, Connecticut experienced a
rapid expansion of trade, economic specialization, and agricultural
commercialization coupled with dramatic increases in population
density.7 4 With these economic changes, commercial exchange
69 See BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN
EARLY CONNECTICUT 2 (1987) (explaining that the book's purpose is to understand
the changing role of law in society from the mid-seventeenth century to the American
Revolution).
7
' See id. at 12 (discussing the somewhat risky nature of book debts for which the
law implied a promise to pay and noting the continued reliance on this system until
as late as the 1720s).
71 See id. at 22-23 (explaining the assumption by courts of the period that each
"book debt" case was unique and that the results were highly contingent on all of the
surrounding circumstances).
72 See id. at 15,23 (arguing that trust was a critical component of these commercial
transactions and notinghow the social context of ongoing relationships enhanced the
level of trust between the parties).
7s See id. at 23-26 (concluding that the informality of "book debt" litigation
"allowed the parties to use the litigation to let off steam").
' See id. at 31-32 (discussing the changes in Connecticut's economy after the
1996] THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND BUSINESS NORMS
became more impersonal, even as social relations remained
communitarian and the new impersonal exchange required uniform
and certain written instruments by which credit transactions could
be evidenced.75 Unlike "book debt," "[a]ctions on written instru-
ments did not admit the range of evidence" allowed in actions on
"book debt."76 Proof focused on a single transaction rather than
a course of dealing, reflecting altered economic conditions "in
which credit was no longer something that grew from transaction to
transaction," but rather "something extended in single transactions
in return for formal admissions of liability." 77  "Book debt"
positively invited litigation;7 ' by contrast, debtors after 1780 never
contested more than ten percent of the actions on written instru-
ments against them.79 Thus, the informality of the "book debt"
system which prevailed under conditions involving long-term
relationships ultimately gave way to more formal written instru-
ments as commercial exchange grew more complex and impersonal.
Of special significance for present purposes, however, is Mann's
finding that during this period of rapid economic change and
increasingly impersonal exchange, it was in the larger, developed
urban towns such as New London and Norwich that "book debt"
remained dominant and litigation frequent.8 " The explanation,
says Mann, is to be found in the fact that the larger towns had
concentrated central business districts in which merchants and other
business people were part of complex, closely related and recurring
transactions, both with each other and with distant traders and
suppliers.8" Within the community of merchants, customary ways
of doing business, characterized by a high degree of trust and
introduction of paper currency in 1709).
71 See id. at 36-37, 43 (listing the advantages of formal written debt instruments
in an expanding economy).76 Id. at 34.
7 Id. at 40.
s Mann notes that during the heyday of "book debt," debt actions between
neighbors made up the vast majority of litigation in his sample. See id. at 17 ("Almost
90 percent of all book debt actions filed in the Hartford County Court in 1700 were
between residents of the county. In 60 percent of the cases, both debtor and creditor
lived in the same town.").
" See id. at 172 app. (calculating that in the 1730s, the percentage of contested
actions based on written instruments dropped to 4.4% from 29.2% in the 1720s and
approximately 40% in the preceding two decades).
o See id. at 56 (finding that book debt was more "suited to communal settings"
such as those found in large urban towns that were centers of credit).
"l See id. at 60 (describing the central business districts of New London and
Norwich).
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informality, had always existed and for such merchants "book debt"
continued to be adequate. 2 More generally, even though residents
of the new commercial towns were much less interdependent on the
whole than residents of the country towns, "their commercial
relations were well developed and likely to be continuing."
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Towns had strongly developed commercial communities character-
ized by the same sort of trust that had made "book debt" viable at
an earlier time in the country towns.
Mann's findings are supported by other studies. In a recent
study of civil litigation patterns in a single local English jurisdiction
between 1683 and 1686, economic historian Craig Muldrew found
that the bulk of litigation involved suits based on informal, oral
credit transactions involving repeat litigants. 4 He concludes that
because "most people lived in very close proximity there would have
been a great deal of personal familiarity in commercial dealing,"
and that the extension of credit on the basis of oral contracts
evidenced how "[a]ll had to trust and also be trusted, and [how]
accessibility to the court was needed to maintain this trust."85
Similar evidence is provided by a study showing how in the early
frontier days, merchants in Massachusetts financed cod fishermen
by recording debts on book and carrying loans to individual
fishermen for a number of years in exchange for the fishermen's
commitment, enforceable via the threat to terminate credit and call
in the outstanding debts, to borrow and buy on credit only from a
particular merchant.8 6 As the seaport world became increasingly
anonymous due to population growth during the mid-eighteenth
century and local capital and labor markets became more reliable,
merchants assumed the entire risk of fishing voyages and no longer
'2 See id. at 43 (explaining that continuing mercantile relationships could have
been harmed by more formal instruments). For a discussion of merchant customs
during this period, see generally WILLIAM T. BAXTER, THE HOUSE OF HANCOCK:
BUSINESS IN BOSTON, 1724-1775 (1945).
a' MANN, supra note 69, at 60-61 (emphasis added) (comparing the composition
of and relationships within county towns and emerging urban centers).
' See Craig Muldrew, Credit and the Courts: Debt Litigation in a Seventeenth-Century
Urban Community, 46 ECON. HIsT. REV. 23, 25 (1993) (noting that 83% of the suits
brought were "trespass on the case" which concerned "agreements which only had the
status of oral contracts at law").
Id. at 36.
See Daniel Vickers, Merchant Credit and Labour Strategies in the Cod Fishey of
Colonial Massachusetts, in MERCHANT CREDIT AND LABOUR STRATEGIES IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 36,39 (Rosemary E. Ommer ed., 1990) (explaining that although "client
fishermen might occasionally try to spread their affairs around, they did so at some
peril to the special relationship with their patron merchants and, therefore, rarely").
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advanced credit to the fishermen. With the disappearance of the
credit, fishermen and merchants no longer had long-term relation-
ships."s Enforcement of the older informal debt obligations
evidenced by book accounts became too risky once the old continu-
ing relationships had been replaced by new, anonymous transac-
tionsa8 and such contract forms disappeared.
Mann's explanation of the superficially puzzling persistence of
informal "book debt" in larger commercial Connecticut towns
during the eighteenth century is supported by many other historical
studies of contracting practices among merchants. These studies
clearly demonstrate that members of small, closely connected
merchant communities with a long and continuing pattern of
repeated commercial interaction trusted a merchant's stake in his
reputation as a guarantee of performance and good faith rather
than contractual formalities such as written agreements. In Ray
Westerfield's classic study of English middlemen during the same
period studied by Mann, he found that neither formal contractual
devices such as bonds, nor organizational structures or accounting
formalities proved effective at controlling fraud and other opportu-
nistic behavior by foreign factoring agents. 9 The problem of
opportunistic behavior by agents abroad was dealt with successfully
only through the evolution of a norm in which merchants mutually
acted as factors for one another, with a merchant's reputation
for honor and trustworthiness constituting the bond against
opportunism.
90
Contemporary accounts similarly support the thesis that
contractual formalities such as written agreements are often
dispensed with within continuing commercial relationships among
"' See id. at 44 (discussing the gradual movement away from long-term relation-
ships between merchants and fishermen during the period from 1675-1725).
" See id. at 46 (analyzing the effects of the disappearance of credit relationships
on the ability of fishermen to remain self-employed).
89 See RAY B. WESTERFIELD, MIDDLEMEN IN ENGuSH BUSINESS, PARTICULARLY
BETWEEN 1660 AND 1760, at 356-58 (1915) (describing a variety of clever means by
which the foreign factors defrauded their principals).
' See id. at 359-60 (explaining the development of international confidence and
trust among merchants with similar practices). A related response to the risk of
opportunism was conducting overseas operations by placing family members in
charge of foreign branches. See STANLEY CHAPMAN, MERCHANT ENTERPRISE IN
BRITAIN: FROM THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION TO WORLD WAR I, at 93-97 (1992)
(finding that merchants employed members of their families, or extended families,
because this was the only way to have confidence in their "correspondants'
discretionary decision making" when communication was slow and difficult).
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members of a defined commercial or merchant community.
Coleman cites the community of City of London merchant bankers
as one in which a high level of trust obviates the need for lawyers
and written contracts even in very large transactions." Coleman
theorizes that mere verbal agreements suffice in such a community
because there is a community norm of dealing only with the most
reputable bankers and reputation for trustworthiness (or its
converse) is quickly communicated within the community of
potential future transactors. 92 Lisa Bernstein has described the
standard transactional model in the New York diamond industry as
one in which a "handshake accompanied by the words mazel u'broche
creates a binding agreement."3  Written offers-scrawled on the
back of an envelope containing the diamonds for sale-are some-
times made in lieu of the handshake deal and both oral agreements
and those made via the written offer are typically concluded with a
signed official weight slip. 94 Still, these writings are relatively
sketchy, and the well-established diamond industry norm is that a
handshake binds. Disputes between members of the diamond
industry club are arbitrated rather than litigated.95 Bernstein
explains this industry's reliance on extralegal contracts by the
density of its social structure. This permits members to obtain
information on each other's reputations at very low cost and to post
effective "reputational bonds" against contract breach." In such
a setting, contract formation requires only enough formality so that
other members of the trade can determine that there was in fact an
agreement.9 7
9 See James S. Coleman, Systems of Trust: A Rough Theoretical Framework, 10
ANGEWANDTE SOZIALFORSCHUNG 277, 286 (1982).
2 See id. at 287 (stating that "among merchant bankers [concern with reputation]
is not a matter of abstract morals but pure self-interest: a merchant banker would
never be trusted, i.e., nevermore be allowed to participate in the flow of credit, if his
integrity in keeping agreements was not trusted, and his business would rapidly
decline if his investment judgment was not trusted").
9' Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in
the Diamond Industry, 21J. LECAL STUD. 115, 121 (1992).
" See id. at 122-23 (describing a system in which a buyer makes an offer by placing
a stone in a precisely sealed envelope on which the buyer writes the terms and
conditions of the offer).
9 5 See id. at 119-20 (noting that as a condition to joining the New York Diamond
Dealers Club, a dealer must agree to submit all disputes with other members arising
from the diamond business to the club's arbitration system).
' See id. at 132-35 (noting that the diamond industry is organized to minimize
information costs pertaining to dealers' reputations).
9 See id. at 133 (arguing that handshakes, cachets, weight slips, and bills of sale
1996] THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND BUSINESS NORMS
C. Some Testable Hypotheses on the Statute of Frauds
and Business Practice
This general empirical evidence puts the reported Statute of
Frauds decisions in a context within which it is possible to set up
some hypotheses regarding their implications for the general
behavioral significance of the Statute. The empirical evidence is
consistent with the game-theoretic conjecture that detailed written
instruments will tend to be the norm in anonymous transactions
among non-repeat players, even when transactions are relatively
simple. This is not to suggest that such written instruments will in
fact evidence a bargained-for agreement. As observed by Mann in
the historical context98 and by many others in more contemporary
settings,9 9 standardized written forms often signify a transactional
setting that by its very anonymity and standardization precludes
individualized assent. Still, the theory suggests that a writing will be
used most by parties who do not have a history of prior dealings.
Without such a history, the parties must rely either on legal
enforcement or extralegal third party enforcement, and to be
effective, either of these types of contractual enforcement require
accurate verification of allegations of breach. The kind of writings
necessary to verify breach to other members of the trade or business
community might differ markedly from what is required by the
Statute of Frauds, although Llewellyn's requirement of "some
writing" may be viewed as a sensible attempt to lessen the disparity
between what other contracting parties need to verify breach and
what the law requires. On this view, contractual complexity ought
to influence the complexity of the writing, but ought not to have a
great affect on the need for a writing qua verification instrument.
When, by contrast, the parties have a history of prior dealings
that has established a basis of trust and/or a significant prospective
future advantage to each in the continuation of the relationship,
one would expect that relationship-specific sanctions for breach will
be predominant. In such relationships, there is little ex ante
expectation of the future need to verify breach to others outside the
supply the requisite degree of formality).
98 See MANN, supra note 69, at 45 (noting that even in the -first half of the
eighteenth century the "formal rationality that made credit instruments so useful in
a commercial economy did not, and could not, admit individual, differential
treatment").
"See Todd Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REv. 1173 (1983).
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relationship, so that a low level of contract formality and, in
particular, a low level of compliance with the formal requirements
of the Statute of Frauds should be expected within such relation-
ships. Here, contractual complexity might create the need for a
written record where the need for an effective sanction for breach
would not. It might well be necessary for busy parties engaged in
a number of complex transactions at any one time to prepare
written contracts, if only for their own purposes in observing and
monitoring contractual performance.
If the threat of extralegal sanctions is effective within such a
social world of repeated relationships, then few if any reported
decisions raising section 2-201 issues should involve parties from
such a community. This reasoning suggests that most reported
decisions should involve non-repeat transactions among relatively
anonymous parties. However, as argued above, both theory and
evidence suggest that parties involved in such non-repeat transac-
tions will take precautions to ensure that their agreement complies
with the formalities requisite to legal enforceability, simply because
legal enforcement is important in such non-repeat transactions.
Thus, in disputes involving discrete, non-repeat transactions, section
2-201 issues should rarely arise. Paradoxically, a theory intended to
explain my sample of reported Statute of Frauds decisions seems to
imply that there should not be any reported decisions. Disputes
involving repeat players should not result in reported decisions
because extralegal sanctions take care of enforcement problems; but
neither should disputes involving non-repeat players generate
reported decisions (especially not appellate decisions) under section
2-201 because the players involved in such relationships should have
been careful to comply with formalities such as the requirement of
an adequate writing.
D. Testing and Refining the Theory of Reported Statute
of Frauds Decisions
My survey of volumes 18-23 of the UCC Reporting Service
Second reveals thirty separate disputes generating decisions that are
digested under section 2-201. Of these decisions, only twenty-four
can fairly be characterized as cases in which there was a live,
litigated issue under section 2-201.1o Out of this base sample of
" The Appendix contains a table of all 30 disputes coded along the
various dimensions discussed supra. As can be seen from reliability checks
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decisions involving actively litigated Statute of Frauds issues, nine
clearly indicated a history of prior dealings between the parties (or
dealings between closely related entities, as between a partnership
and a partner). Fourteen decisions in the sample contained no
indication of any previous dealings or relationship between the
parties.101
1. Explaining Cases with No History of Prior Dealings
The simple theory elaborated above fails to predict the litigation
of so many section 2-201 disputes. A closer look at the sampled
section 2-201 decisions reveals why and suggests a broader theory
that does succeed in explaining the observed pattern of reported
section 2-201 decisions. Consider first those decisions where the
facts indicated that the parties had not dealt with each other before
and were strangers to each other. The first fundamental feature of
these "stranger" disputes is that in all but one such case the parties
did have a writing and in most cases, many writings. In all of the
"stranger" cases with a writing (save one), the court found that the
Statute of Frauds applied and determined the statutory sufficiency
of the writing in a way that was true to the business practice among
strangers of requiring a writing. Of these fourteen decisions, ten of
them directly involved the issue of whether the parties had an
agreement; in the other four cases, the Statute of Frauds issue was
a marginal, throw away argument made in the context of a dispute
over the terms of the agreement.
Jones v. Wide World of Cars, Inc.112 constitutes a case of the
former, no-agreement sort. In that case, the putative buyer wired
a $50,000 deposit on a Ferrari and the seller then mailed the buyer
a purchase order that explicitly stated: "'THIS AGREEMENT IS
NOT BINDING UNLESS SIGNED BY THE SELLER AND THE
contained in the Appendix, the code "live, litigated section 2-201 dispute" may
suffer from some reliability problems. However, the inclusion in the sample of the
two or three cases which some research assistants did not feel raised "live, litigated"
§ 2-201 issues is not likely to effect the qualitative nature or significance of the
results.
101 One case, Christensen v. Ransom, 844 P.2d 1349 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992), could
not be clearly coded as having or not having a history of prior dealings. Interestingly,
this case presented strong evidence that the parties were part of a network of
interlocking social relations. Another case, American Dredging Co. v. Plaza
Petroleum Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D.N.Y. 1992), generated two separate opinions
and was coded only once.
10 820 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
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BUYER.' 1 °" The buyer did not sign and rejected the purchase
order on receipt, allegedly because the price it stated was too
high."°4 The court held that the buyer's down payment could not
substitute for a writing to evidence agreement0 5 and said that the
down payment in such a transaction was a signal of the buyer's
seriousness rather than of his irrevocable commitment.10 6 The
court found that in such a context, the buyer was not bound prior
to fulfilling the statutory requirement of a signed writing.' This
decision illustrates the Statute of Frauds functioning as intended-
that is, acting to prevent a party from asserting that there was an
agreement when in fact there was none (assuming that the court is
correct in its standard interpretation of the significance of' the
buyer's deposit in the given context). By contrast, the decision in
Figueroa v. Kit-San Co."' involved a complex series of writings and
issues of formation under section 2-207 and mentioned the Statute
of Frauds issue only tangentially in commenting that the parties
had admitted the oral contract in their pleadings and did not
dispute that the buyer ordered the material and that the seller had
delivered. 109
The sample of reported Statute of Frauds disputes among
strangers thus displays two types of cases: those in which the
Statute of Frauds argument is central to the court's decision
whether the parties had actually reached agreement1 and those
1
03 Id. at 134.
"' See id. (noting that the buyer claimed he rejected the purchase price because
it indicated a price of $800,000 that was allegedly at odds with the seller's oral
representations and its advertising).
" See id. at 137 (positing that New York law "precludes use of down payments for
automobiles as a substitute for a written contract signed by the buyer").
1"8 See id. ("A consumer putting down a payment is making a monetary sacrifice
and showing good faith seriousness to encourage the seller to take the potential sale
seriously and to hold the goods.").
"o See id. (observing that "ordinary public expectation would be flouted by a
ruling that one who puts money down, becomes committed to a transaction for which
the details have yet to be established").
108 845 P.2d 567 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992).
1o8 See id. at 574 (noting that the formation of an oral contract was undisputed and
the dispute was over the terms of the contract).
"' See Nucor Corp. v. Aceros y Maquilas de Occidente, SA. de C.V., 28 F.3d 572,
586-88 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding that no authorized agent for the manufacturer ever
signed the buyer's written order and that the agreements between a middleman and
the buyer did not bind the manufacturer); L.J.R. Ryan v. Wersi Elec. GmbH & Co.,
3 F.3d 174, 180-82 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that detailed letters and draft written
proposals were sufficient as a confirmation of the agreement but finding that the
agreement was too indefinite to enforce); Akrosil Div. of Int'l Paper Co. v. Ritrama
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in which the Statute of Frauds issue is merely part of a general
shotgun blast by the defendant-a blast aimed primarily at other
issues involving formation or interpretation.'
Since a decision by the court that the writings in question are
insufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds effectively defeats the
plaintiff's contract claim, it is not surprising that the argument is
sometimes a marginal part of the overall defense. It is, moreover,
a purely legal issue that can be raised and litigated at very low
marginal cost; even a small probability of success would justify
incurring such small marginal cost. As for the cases involving
more substantial use of the Statute-those where the sufficiency of
the writings goes to the core issue of whether there was an agree-
ment as alleged-these cases are precisely what the Statute was
intended to cover. My reading of the ten decisions involving
such use of the Statute is that in every such case, the court's
Duramark, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 623, 627-28 (E.D. Wis. 1994) (deeming a letter that set
forth terms of a settlement agreement to be insufficient for Statute of Frauds
purposes because it was never signed by the offeree);Jones v. Wide World of Cars,
Inc., 820 F. Supp. 132 (see supra notes 102-07 and accompanying text); First Valley
Leasing Inc. v. Goushy, 795 F. Supp. 693, 696 (D.NJ. 1992) (finding an invoice with
letterhead to be sufficient to meet the signature requirement of the Statute of Frauds
where other evidence ofagreement existed); T.K. Stanley, Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 793
F. Supp. 707,710-11 (S.D. Miss. 1992) (relying on the Statute of Frauds to bar alleged
oral agreement to sell the timber rights to .the plaintiff if plaintiff purchased the
underlingland); In re Atkins, 139 B.R. 39,40-41 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (deeming an
alleged written modification of an installment sales contract to be insufficient because
it was never executed by creditor and was conditional on acceptance of debtor's
chapter 13 plan); Champion Turf, Inc. v. Rice, Papuchis Constr. Co., 853 S.W.2d 323,
326 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that a seller's written proposal and a buyer's order
that were accepted by performance constituted the complete contract between the
parties when both parties were merchants under § 2-201(2)); McCulley Fine Arts
Gallery v. "X" Partners, 860 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) (finding § 2-201 Statute
of Frauds inapplicable to a brokered option to buy fine art); Baker Hughes, Inc. v.
Schwarz, 833 S.W.2d 292, 295 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (denying the enforcement of a
claimed agreement pursuant to the Statute of Frauds where the third party offerors
alleged oral contract).
" See Magallanes Inv., Inc. v. Circuit Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1214, 1219-20 (7th
Cir. 1993) (finding a formation norm in the shipping brokerage trade to be an
exchange of telexes followed by a written memorandum of agreement and thus
deeming telexes to be sufficient under the Statute of Frauds); In re MSR Exploration,
Ltd., 147 B.R. 560, 570 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1992) (focusing the analysis on an
interpretation of a contract between the parties rather than the Statute of Frauds
issue); Figueroa v. Kit-San Co., 845 P.2d 567 (see supra notes 108-09 and accompany-
ing text); Dixon v. Roberts, 853 P.2d 235, 238 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993) (deeming the
Statute of Frauds issue to be marginal where the seller sent a letter summarizing
phone conversations in which the option to purchase ostriches was offered and
accepted).
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decision correctly mirrored the actual significance of having a
writing. This is not merely a tautological expression of an
underlying assumption that the transactional norms governing
dealings between non-repeat, sophisticated players dictate that
there is no agreement until such a writing. It is instead consistent
with the general pattern of writings used by the parties in the
particular cases, a pattern obviously subject to the court's rhetorical
abilities in opinion-writing, but which is nonetheless striking in its
consistency.
A close look at the sample of stranger Statute of Frauds
reported decisions thus tends not to undercut, but rather to
strongly confirm the theory elaborated above. Sophisticated
strangers contract via quite formal writings, and the determinative
Statute of Frauds issue in cases involving such parties is not whether
a contract can exist and be enforced without a writing, but whether
the writings are sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements. As
predicted, legal enforceability seems important in this context and
Statute of Frauds issues arise precisely as they should, given the
underlying purpose of the writing requirement, as marginal but
quite rational attempts to evade enforcement.
2. Explaining Cases with a History of Prior Dealings
A stark contrast emerges when one takes a close look at the nine
sampled Statute of Frauds decisions involving a pattern of prior
dealings between the parties. In six of these cases, it is quite
clear that the parties did not have a written contract.1 2 None of
these decisions involved the sufficiency of the parties' writings; all of
them involved instead the issue of whether one of the statutory
exceptions applied so that a contract could be found despite the
informality of the parties' dealings-despite their failure to have a
writing. Such decisions strikingly confirm the theoretical prediction
that parties enmeshed in long-term, continuing patterns of dealing
ought to be rather indifferent to the requirements for legal
enforceability.
In confirming the theoretically predicted relative informality in
repeat-player settings, the sampled cases suggest that indifference
to legal formality is a function of the strategic nature of the
parties' dyadic relationship, rather than their sophistication or
2 As noted in the Appendix, there was virtual 100% reliability in the coding for
whether or not there was a writing.
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membership in a clearly defined "merchant" community. For
instance, in Buffaloe v. Hart,"1 the plaintiff tobacco farmer, who
had known the defendants for ten years and had previously rented
tobacco barns and bought equipment from them, testified that
"4'we always done it on a handshake agreement, cash basis. That's
the way it was.'"1" 4 The parties then agreed, while standing in
defendant's front yard, that the plaintiff would purchase the
barns, and this too was accepted with a handshake. 5 The court
held that there was sufficient evidence of "acceptance" to bring
the case within an exception to the Statute of Frauds." 6 It found
evidence of agreement in testimony by a number of town residents
that the plaintiff had told them he had bought the barns, by an
auctioneer that plaintiff had contracted with him to sell the
barns, and by a repair man the plaintiff had hired to fix the
barns.117
The same sort of informality found in dealings between the
relatively unsophisticated parties in Buffaloe v. Hart is also found
when more sophisticated players are in a long-term relationship. In
Atlantic Paper Box Co. v. Whitman's Chocolates,"' a candy box
manufacturer which had done about forty percent of its business
over a period of several years with Whitman's Chocolates received
phone orders totalling over one million dollars along with a request
that it reserve capacity to accommodate likely additional orders and
an assurance that Whitman's was not a takeover target. When
Whitman's was acquired and the new company reneged on the deal,
Atlantic sued to enforce the contract and the court held that
allegations of a course of dealing where the contract was made
without a writing were sufficient to avoid the Statute of Frauds. The
other cases depicting parties with a prior relationship and no
writing involve similar reasoning by the court in finding an
exception to the Statute.
1 19
's 441 S.E.2d 172 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
14 Id. at 173.
115 See id.
11 See id. at 176.
117 See id.
11 844 F. Supp. 1038 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
"s See Dawkins & Co. v. L & L Planting Co., 602 So. 2d 838 (Miss. 1992). An
experienced cotton planter with over 4200 acres in combined cultivation and a cotton
buyer had a longstanding (10 to 15 years) relationship during which they had typically
concluded forward contracts over the phone. According to the deposition of the
cotton buyer,
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In the three cases involving parties with prior dealings who
did have written contracts, one involved a very sketchy written
contract among close associates, and in this case, like those
without a writing, the court found a statutory exception.121 The
other two cases in which parties with prior dealings used written
contracts involved a relatively complex distributorship agree-
ment,1 2 1 where the appellate court rejected the decision of the
lower court to raise, sua sponte, the Statute of Frauds issue
despite the existence of a signed writing, and a fuel oil purchase
that involved battle of the forms type warranty and damage
limitation issues but which was concluded via telex (and hence
might well be viewed as not being in writing at all). 22 These latter
two cases confirm the theoretical prediction that writings will be
observed in relatively complex transactions between parties with
repeat dealings.
Mr. Love [the seller] usually when he got ready to sell his cotton he
would call me. He told me from time to time: "No need in bugging me or
bothering me or soliciting my business. When I'm ready to sell, I'll
call you." And this was the sort of relationship we cultivated through the
years.
Id. at 840. In August, 1986, the planter called and said "'you've been handling my
cotton for 10 or 15 years. You know I'm going to have a lot of middling cotton.'"
The planter continued "'If you can get that close to 60 cents, then you've got my
cotton. Consider it sold.'" Id. When the planter's son, and business partner, refused
to execute this final contract, the buyer sued, and the court found that the merchant
exception to § 2-201 applied to bind the planter. See id. at 843; see also Steege v.
Affiliated Bank/North Shore Nat'l (In re Alper-Richman Furs, Ltd.), 147 B.R. 140, 148
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (finding no need for a writing in a case involving an unwritten
consignment sales agreement because the parties had performed the agreements);
Hurwitz v. Prime Communications, Inc., 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1213
(Mass. Super. Ct. 1994) (deeming Statute of Frauds inapplicable in case involving an
alleged unwritten agreement to confer additional increased salary and relying instead
on promissory estoppel when plaintiffwas fraudulently induced to forgo a portion of
her salary in return for promise of later benefits); D.A. Elia Constr. Corp. v. Lyco,
Inc., 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1049 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (enforcing contract
under principle ofpromnissory estoppel based on confirmatory memo sent by general
contractor to subcontractor).
120 See Uni-Products, Inc. v. Bearse (In re Uni-Products, Inc.), 153 B.R. 764, 770-71
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993) (applying the exception to the Statute of Frauds for
"received and accepted" goods where seller of machine claimed that lie effectively
kept title to machine because he never signed sale agreement).
12 See Wells, Waters & Gases, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 19 F.3d 157, 161-
63 (4th Cir. 1994).
'2 See American Dredging Co. v. Plaza Petroleum Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1335, 1338
(E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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8. Explaining the Use of Written Contracts: Some
Econometric Evidence
The informal evidence recounted thus far tends to strongly
confirm the theoretical prediction that parties with an established
history of doing business with each other ought to largely eschew
contract enforcement formalities such as the Statute of Frauds
writing requirement. Nothing has been said, however, about
transactional complexity as a competing explanation for when and
why parties use written contracts. This section presents some
statistical results which suggest that it is the relationship variable
(that is, whether or not the parties have a history of prior dealings)
and not transactional complexity that best predicts and explains
their use of written instruments.
The sample consists of twenty-three observations. Each
observation is a coded case, and the coding of each case is given in
the Appendix. The dependent variable is WRITE, a binary variable
that takes the value "1" if the case is coded as one in which the
parties used any writing to negotiate and draft their contract and
"0" if they did not. The explanatory variables are "PRIORD," and
"ITRANS2" and "ITRANS3." The variable PRIORI) takes the value
"1" if the case is coded as depicting parties with a history of prior
dealings, and "0" if there is no such history. Transaction complexity
was coded at three levels: "simple," "moderate," and "high."
ITRANS2 is a dummy that takes the value "I" if the transaction is
coded as moderately complex; ITRANS3 is a dummy that takes the
value "1" if the transaction is coded as simple. The cases were
coded by myself and three research assistants. As displayed in the
Appendix, coding reliability-roughly, the extent of agreement
across coders in their coding decisions-was very high for the
WRITE dependent variable. It was not so high for the complexity
variables, and the PRIORD variable, but still generally within the
range of what is considered acceptable in qualitative research of this
sort.
123
One way to get some sense of the relative importance of the
various explanatory variables is through a simple correlation
"z For a general discussion of reliability and other criteria of data acceptability in
qualitative research, see GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: SCIENTIFC
INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 23-27 (1994). For a more detailed discussion
of reliability, including the consistency-type measures displayed in the Appendix, see
EDWARD G. CARMINES & RICHARD A. ZELLER, RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY ASSESSMENT
43-47 (1979).
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analysis. Such an analysis, depicted in Table 1 below, shows that
both prior dealings and transaction simplicity are quite strongly
negatively correlated with the use of a writing. These qualitative
relationships are as predicted, as is the positive correlation between
moderate transactional complexity and the use of writing. At the
same time, there appears to be little if any collinearity between the
dummies for transaction complexity and the prior dealings variable.
TABLE 1
Correlation Results
WRrTE PRIOR]) INTRANS2 ITRANS3
WRITE 1.000
PRIORD -0.537 1.000
ITRANS2 0.215 0.054 1.000
ITRANS3 -0.387 0.102 -0.479 1.000
The lack of collinearity between the complexity variables and the
prior dealings variable is reassuring in performing the next step in
the quantitative analysis, which is to perform a logit regression of
WRITE on the vector of explanatory variables. While a full
discussion is obviously beyond the scope of the present Article,
124
the basic idea behind a logit analysis is to treat a dichotomous left
hand side variable such as WRITE as a probability (here, the
probability of a writing) which is explained by various factors. That
is, even if the model presumes that whether the parties use or do
not use a writing is a deterministic choice variable, the econometric
specification of the problem allows for randomness in the sample
and/or model incompleteness. The logit multiple regression allows
the statistical significance of the various explanatory variables to be
independently identified and tested.
The results of such a regression are presented in Table 2. As
indicated by the table, the sign on the coefficient for the prior
dealings variable is as predicted, in that prior dealings lower the
probability that we will observe the use of a writing in contract
124 For such discussions, see, for example, PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO
ECONOMETRICS 228-46 (3d ed. 1992), or J.S. CRAMER, THE LOcIT MODEL: AN
INTRODUCTION FOR ECONOMISTS (1991).
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formation. Moreover, only the PRIORD variable is statistically
significant at the conventional five percent level. None of the
complexity variables are statistically significant, although all
(including the constant) are of the predicted sign. Of the complex-
ity variables, high complexity would seem (through the constant) to
be the most important, positive factor favoring a writing.
TABLE 2
Regression Results
Coefficient Standard Error z Pr J [zj
PRIORD -3.02 1.33 -2.256 0.024
ITRANS2 0.837 1.39 0.600 0.54
ITRANS3 -2.233 1.754 -1.28 0.20
Constant 2.07 1.21 1.709 0.08
Chi-Squared = 10.66, with 3 degrees of freedom significant at 0.014 level
Log Likelihood = -9.531
As one would expect with such a relatively small sample test, all
of the standard errors are relatively large. Caution must be
exercised in interpreting these results as a refutation of complexity
as an explanation for the use of a writing, if only because of the
difficulty in obtaining reliable measures of transactional complexity.
Still, the regressions are useful in allowing one to separate the
effects of the strategic nature of the parties' relationship from the
effects of transactional complexity. In this regard, they suggest that
at least in my sample, the parties' history of prior dealings is an
important and statistically significant explanation for their decision
whether to use written instruments in contract formation.
E. Explaining Statute of Frauds Litigation
The theory developed above predicts what my admittedly small
sample displays: informal contract formation between players in
continuing relationships. But the theory also predicts that such
decisions ought not to arise at all. Perhaps the most direct
explanation of why disputes arising out of long-term relationships
result in litigation is that these disputes are litigated only when the
assumptions underlying the effectiveness of extralegal sanctions are
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not met. The assumptions may fail in a variety of ways. If the
primary extralegal sanction for contract nonperformance is the
adverse effect on market or community-wide reputation that such
nonperformance would create (third party sanctions), then such
sanctions may have little teeth if one of the parties is new to the
community and unfamiliar with its norms of informal dispute
resolution. Such a neophyte may simply make an error, and refuse
to settle, triggering a pattern of future sanctions-in the form of
refusals to deal, or in the form of much less favorable terms-the
magnitude of which she seriously underestimated.'2 5 Similarly, as
Mark Ramseyer has conjectured, a business entity that is small and
not well known will not have sufficient "reputational capital" at
stake, making reputation alone insufficient as a performance
bond. 2 ' At the other end of the life cycle, one of the parties may
soon exit the community, and hence no longer concern herself with
reputation, making litigation the only effective enforcement device.
None of these reasons why third party sanctions may be
ineffective directly addresses the conclusion drawn from my sample,
which is that litigation occurs even when the parties have the sort
of longstanding relationship that should make second party
enforcement effective. The game-theoretic account of second party
enforcement provided earlier does, however, suggest several reasons
why litigation may occur even when the contracting parties initially
thought that second party enforcement would preclude litigation.
The simplest of these reasons is that the factors making for effective
second party sanctions are not present despite evidence of a prior
relationship. If, for instance, the parties never expected the
relationship to continue, or neither was at particular risk of loss
within the relationship, then termination and litigation may have
been anticipated from the outset.
127
125 When economic expansion brought an influx of newcomers into Connecticut
merchant ranks, there was a sharp increase in the rate at which informal commercial
arbitration failed, and it was against this background of increasing failure that
merchants pushed for the first time for statutes making promises to arbitrate and
arbitration awards formally enforceable at law. See MANN, supra note 69, at 126-28.
6 See J. Mark Ramseyer, Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of
Defection injapan, 20J. LEGAL STUD. 91, 96-97 (1991) (discussing several reasons why
legal rules matter even in markets, such asJapanese banking, where it is believed that
contracts are enforced more by social norms than legal sanctions).
127 Empirical support for this explanation is provided, somewhat paradoxically, by
Thomas M. Palay, Comparative Institutional Economics: The Governance of Rail Freight
Contracting, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 265 (1984). Palay conducted 35 interviews with rail
freight shippers and carriers involved in 51 transactions. Many of these transactions
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A second, and somewhat less straightforward, situation in which
litigation may ensue despite an ex ante perception that second party
sanctions would suffice is when the relationship itself is terminated
for reasons exogenous to the relationship. If, for instance, one of
the parties goes out of business, or is expected to go out of
business, the possibility of future dealings no longer exists (or is
much less likely), and so the threat to terminate or degrade the
relationship is no longer adequate to insure cooperative behavior
within the relationship. There is no reason not to litigate disputes
that arise in the context of relationships that are doomed to end in
any event.1 28
A third reason why second party enforcement may fail and
litigation may ensue is that the parties' gain from the relationship
relative to their outside opportunities may change exogenously. On
the theory sketched earlier, the credibility of termination as a
punishment for nonperformance depends upon the presence of
plausible outside alternatives for the threatening party. Should
market opportunities for such a party worsen, termination may no
longer be credible, leaving litigation as the only way to punish a
perceived breach. On the other side of the equation, a sudden shift
in the value of cheating to one of the parties may make termination
ineffective even if credible. For instance, an unexpected business
opportunity revealed by the very fact of the parties' relationship
may be so valuable to one of the parties that it is worth sacrificing
the relationship.
A fourth and final reason is somewhat more general. Especially
in multidimensional relationships, the optimal punishment strategy
may not be the simplistic alternative of terminating the relationship
and sacrificing its benefits, but rather the gradual degradation of
one's contribution to it. But when the payoff to the other party of
were governed by implicit contractual terms that were not legally enforceable.
Although Palay classified transactions as to the degree of asset of investment
specificity, in order to test Williamsonian hypotheses on the relationship between
asset specificity and governance structure, it is not clear what sort of variation in
governance structure was either expected or observed in his interviews. What is a
quite clear finding is that in the absence of legal enforceability, the parties in Palay's
sample relied either on the availability of ready market substitutes-and the threat of
relationship termination-or market reputation to ensure performance. The ready
availability of a market exit option is, of course, precisely what Williamson's theory-of
competition prior to, but commitment after contracting-denies.
128 Once a relationship has been terminated, "factors such as personal relation-
ships and the desire for future business will have little effect," leaving litigation as the
only effective alternative. Macaulay, supra note 7, at 65.
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various actions is uncertain, such a strategy of gradual or limited
"cheating" risks terminating the relationship anyway. That is, if the
cost inflicted is too great, the other side may terminate in response.
For this reason, litigation-a sanction imposed by the court,
according to its standards-may be a lower risk strategy than second
party gradualism.
There is a good deal of general empirical evidence supporting
the plausibility of litigation even when second party enforcement is
potentially effective. One of the most important findings in the
historical literature on debt litigation is that litigation was very
frequent even among people who were enmeshed in continuing
relationships.'29  A related finding-which supports the tradeoff
between second party and third party sanctions-is that only when
a merchant community is small, powerful, and ethnically or
religiously homogeneous does one find that the community
completely eschews litigation as a means of settling disputes among
its members.'30 As merchant communities become more diffuse
and competitive with the entry of newcomers, the power of
extralegal sanctions against contractual breach by its members
weakens.1 31 Even more important, perhaps, is the wealth of evi-
dence indicating the tremendous instability of extralegal enforce-
ment mechanisms in situations where the parties' interactions
See MANN, supra note 69, at 2; see also Muldrow, supra note 84, at 25.
's This pattern is very strong across both time and place. See e.g., DAVID H.
FISCHER, ALBION'S SEED: FOUR BRmISH FOLKwAYs IN AMERICA 586 (1989) (observing
how 18th-century Delaware Valley Quakers were forbidden to "go to law" against one
another, with resort to legal enforcement sometimes punished by expulsion from
meeting); Greif, supra note 49, at 535-42 (recounting and explaining how the
Maghribi tribe, a model that emphasizes the need for dense interaction and
homogeneity within the group, controlled international trade during the middle ages
without legal enforcement); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade:
Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49J. ECON. HIsT. 49 (1989);Janet T. Landa, A Theoy
of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional Alternative to Contract
Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 355-57 (1981) (developing a theory of ethical codes
embedded in kinship/ethnic relations as a functional equivalent of the law of
contracts); Jack L. Carr & Janet T. Landa, The Economics of Symbols, Clan Names 6?
Religion, 12J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 138-144 (1983) (developing a theory of personalized
exchange as a substitute for imperfect or nonexistent contract enforcement in which
membership in thin space is easily identifiable and verifiable, and ethnic and religious
groups provide assurance of group membership and effective future social sanctions);
Bernstein, supra note 93, at 130-42 (explaining the pattern of nonlegal sanctions in
the wholesale diamond trade).
15 For a theoretical demonstration that profit-maximizing merchant groups with
effective internal sanctions against contractual breach will choose a suboptimally small
group, see Robert Cooter &Janet T. Landa, Personal Versus Impersonal Trade: The Size
of Trading Groups and Contract Law, 4 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 15, 17-19 (1984).
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extend beyond a single dimension of commercial dealings to
encompass an entire social relationship. In such settings, punish-
ment strategies are often observed to degenerate into uncontrolled
cycles of retaliation, where the targets of retaliation involve relations
that have little or nothing to do with the transactional basis of the
original dispute.' 2
There are, therefore, both theoretical and empirical reasons to
think that second party sanctions will fail in at least three situations:
1) where the relationship is terminated or will soon terminate for
unanticipated exogenous reasons; 2) where an exogenous change in
the value of the relationship or outside opportunities has occurred;
and 3) where the relationship is complex, social/business, and
payoffs from punishment are likely to be unknown.
My sample of nine reported decisions involving litigation
between parties with prior dealings seems to be very well explained
by this three-factor theory. Two of the cases involve a party in
bankruptcy.'33 Five others involve the termination of the previ-
ously continuing relationship for other reasons-acquisition of one
of the contracting parties by a third party,3 termination of a
distributor after repeated failures by the distributor to pay past due
accounts,' 5 termination of both the parties' business relationship
and their romantic affair,13 6 replacement of one of the continuing
players by a new entrant,' and an extension of the parties'
132 See FISCHER, suprla note 130, at 767-68 (discussing how the tradition of the
blood feud was carried to American back country by settlers from the Scotch-English
border, and how feuds began in a variety of ways, such as loss or theft of property or
other material injuries, and quickly spread to uncontrollable clan warfare involving
death and serious injury); ROBERT FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN REASON: THE STRATEGIC
ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS (1988) (explaining the role of emotions in provoking and
maintaining such patterns of retribution); MANN, supra note 69, at 19 (observing that
while colonial townsmen may have found it easier to trust one another than to trust
strangers, the "multiplicity ofsocial relations" among town members made it "difficult
to contain disputes to the particular transactions that produce them," and recounting
an instance in which debt litigation between two families was only one of six lawsuits
between them).
'" See Uni-Products, Inc. v. Bearse (In re Uni-Products, Inc.), 153 B.R. 764 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1993); In re Alper-Richman Furs, Ltd., 147 B.R. 140 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1992).
134 See Atlantic Paper Box Co. v. Whitman's Chocolates, 844 F. Supp. 1038, 1041
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that Whitman's relationship with Atlantic ceased when Russell
Stover acquired Whitman's).
. See Wells, Waters & Gases, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 19 F.3d 157, 159-
61 (4th Cir. 1994).
1" See Hurwitz v. Prime Communications, Inc., 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 1213, 1215 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1994).
" See Dawkins & Co. v. L & L Planting Co., 602 So. 2d 838, 840-41 (Miss. 1992)
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dealings to a transaction of much greater magnitude than those that
had formed the basis of their relationship.S The final two cases,
American Dredging'3 9 and Elia,"4 ° involved situations where, given
termination of the relationship as a strategic response, litigation
remained attractive, even if perhaps unanticipated at the outset.
Thus, of the repeat player cases in my sample, seven involve either
an endgame situation in which the relationship between the parties
has terminated, or an unusual and unusually large transaction
between the parties. The sample strongly confirms that resort to
legal sanctions typically signals the end of the previously continuing
relationship, a relationship not formed with the expectation that
legal enforcement might be important.
On the other hand, while promising, my sample of repeat player
Statute of Frauds cases displays only one case, Christensen v. Ran-
som, 41 in which the parties' relations were seemingly so inter-
twined and necessarily continuing that litigation might be viewed as
a way of keeping the peace between them and allowing the
relationship to continue.
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III. TOWARD ROBUST INFERENCE FROM REPORTED DECISIONS:
QUALIFYING THE TEST
The series of inferences drawn from my sample of published
section 2-201 opinions invites challenge on the ground that
published opinions are unrepresentative of the larger universe of
underlying disputes as well as of the sub-universe of litigated
disputes. The ability to draw inferences regarding the larger
universe of disputes from such a sample depends upon the
relationship between the sample and the larger universe. Ideally,
one would have access to at least one survey which samples the
universe of Article 2 formation disputes directly, thus capturing
both those disputes that end in litigation and a possible opinion
and those that are resolved extralegally. Unfortunately, no such
survey exists. Alternatively, one might look to the existing evidence
(noting that a cotton planter and cotton buyer had a 10- to 15-year relationship, but
the planter's son entered the business and refused to honor an oral contract).
"' See Buffaloe v. Hart, 441 S.E.2d 172, 173 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
... American Dredging Co. v. Plaza Petroleum Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D.N.Y.
1992).
140 D.A. Elia Constr. Corp. v. Lyco Inc., 18 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1049
(W.D.N.Y. 1991).
141 844 P.2d 1349 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993).
142 See id.
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on the relationship between published (or unpublished) opinions
and the underlying dispute universe for other sorts of disputes and
then correct that relationship for systematic differences between
dispute types. Unfortunately, even this sort of evidence does not
yet exist. What does exist is a small amount of literature examining
the relationship between cases that are filed and those that generate
a published opinion. This literature suggests how inferences drawn
from samples of published cases may need to be qualified to
account for the unrepresentative character of cases that generate
published opinions.
Using the Federal Courts filing database, Siegelman and
Donohue have found that the proportion of employment discrimina-
tion cases filed in the Northern District of Illinois which generated
opinions "published" in LEXIS rose from six percent to twenty-
seven percent between 1974 and 1986.14 They also found sub-
stantial geographic variation in the frequency of publication-the
probability of a published opinion in the Southern District of New
York was over thirty-eight percent in 1986.144 As for the represen-
tativeness of published opinions, Siegelman and Donohue made
several general points:
1. Cases ending in settlement are less likely to generate a
published opinion, so that published opinions may tend to
overrepresent disputes arising in uncertain areas of the
law; 45
2. When only one party is a repeat player-as in products liability
suits that do not involve repeat player plaintiffs' attorneys-
there may be a tendency for the repeat player to settle with a
higher probability and yet contest litigated cases more
vigorously, so that samples of published opinions over-
represent equal stakes lawsuits;1
46
3. As a matter of judicial behavior, judges are more likely to
write and submit opinions to LEXIS when they view the issues
in the case as novel or important.
14
' See Siegelman & Donohue, supra note 21, at 1140.
144 See id. at 1144 ("The probability that a randomly selected case would come
from the Southern District of New York is only 22.4 percent, while the probability
that a randomly selected published opinion would come from the same district is 38.5
percent.")
145 See id. at 1147-48.
14 See id. at 1148.
"7 See id. at 1149.
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Testing these hypotheses against a coded sample of all cases
filed, Siegelman and Donohue found statistical support for the
hypothesis that cases with published opinions tend to involve higher
stakes, greater complexity and novelty, and tend to take much
longer to process than do those without published opinions.
148
Siegelman and Donohue did not attempt to test the second
hypothesis on repeat player behavior. Data from the District of
Minnesota, collected and analyzed by Susan Olson 149 tend to cast
some doubt on the repeat player hypothesis. Olson found that
organizational presence-a likely proxy for repeat player status-was
not related to likelihood of publication in a statistically significant
way. 150 Moreover, as a theoretical matter, the notion that repeat
player litigants are both more likely to settle and more likely to
contest cases that do not settle may conflate two rather distinct
strategic alternatives.
Let us take it as tentatively established that in contract law as in
employment discrimination, published opinions tend to overrepre-
sent complex, uncertain or novel legal issues and litigants with large
stakes in the disputes. What does this pattern imply about the
robustness of my inferences regarding Statute of Frauds disputes?
Perhaps my key finding is that in my sample of published opinions,
disputes where the parties had a pattern of prior dealings are much
more likely to involve no written contract than are those where the
parties had no prior dealings. The inference drawn from this
finding was that, as predicted, repeat player transactions are
characterized by a lower level of formality and less concern with
legal enforceability. This inference would be weakened or
destroyed by the Priest-Klein selection bias if the more complex or
high stakes disputes among players with a history of prior dealings
tend to be those where there is no writing, for then the occurrence
of such an issue in this sub-sample of published opinions would
simply illustrate the tendency for published opinions to discuss
complex issues. But if the more complex disputes involving the
Statute of Frauds are those involving the absence of a writing then
one ought also to observe an overrepresentation of cases involving
this issue in the sample of (coded) stranger cases. That the coded
litigant status so strongly predicts the presence or absence of a
1
48 See id. at 1165-66.
149 See Susan M. Olson, Studying Federal District Courts Through Published Cases: A
Research Note, 15 JusT. Sys. J. 782, 793 (1992).
150 See id.
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written contract and yet is itself unrelated to the complexity of the
underlying legal issue, strongly suggests that selection bias does not
account for the observed relationship between status and the
writing.
IV. CONCLUSION: RATIONAL CASE SELECTION AND ARGUMENTS
FOR ABOLISHING THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
The previous Part explains the two observed patterns in
reported decisions involving section 2-201. Cases that involve
relatively anonymous one-shot transactions present situations in
which the parties had a writing and the defendant questions the
sufficiency of the writing. In cases involving repeat players, the
parties often did not have a writing and the issue of whether a
writing is required or whether instead one of the statutory excep-
tions applied becomes determinative. These positive findings have
implications for the normative debate over abolition of the Statute
of Frauds.
As noted above, the essence of the argument for abolishing the
Statute of Frauds is that it does not have any effect in channeling
behavior and that even if it did, frauds regarding the existence of a
contract will occur regardless of whether there is a writing. The
belief that the Statute of Frauds does not affect behavior is based
entirely on (a) the lack of any empirical evidence that it does, and
(b) the spectra ofjudges engaging in strained interpretations of the
statutory requirements and exceptions in order to find that the
Statute does not apply when confronted with clear nonwritten
evidence of an agreement. Even if one were of the view that many
of the reported decisions I surveyed involve strained interpretations
in an effort to find that the Statute does not apply, that these
arguments are raised does not indicate that the Statute has no
influence on behavior. To the contrary, that they are raised-along
with sufficiency arguments-by non-repeat players for whom an
assurance of legal enforceability is important suggests that for this
class of transactions, the formal requirements of the Statute may
indeed shape ex ante behavior. Moreover, in my view, courts in the
sample cases correctly identified the controlling norm between
strangers that no agreement exists until a signed writing is executed.
In addition, my finding that disputes where judges actually do
find a statutory exception to the writing requirement are those
where continuing relations between the parties make legal enforce-
ment secondary to nonlegal sanctions also fails to support the
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desirability of the Statute's abolition. The logical reform suggested
by these cases is to require a writing only if the norm in the relevant
community is to have a writing. It may sometimes be possible for
judges to ascertain with a high degree of accuracy whether commu-
nity norms dictate that there is no contract until a formal closing
involving execution of a written agreement. For instance, it is well
understood that commercial lenders and borrowers are not bound
prior to execution of a written commitment letter'5 1 and that
merger or acquisition agreements are not made by letters of intent
or announcements of preliminary agreements but only at the time
of formal closing.'5 2 The problem with this approach is that each
case must be categorized as to the community norm, and if judges
sometimes make errors in categorization, then the norm discovery
approach will create uncertainty regarding whether there is an
agreement without a writing. Such uncertainty will have little ex
ante effect on behavior within communities where legal enforce-
ment is unimportant. It will have its greatest and most harmful ex
ante effect precisely in those communities where legal enforcement
matters and where ex ante contracting behavior is strongly shaped
by the formal requirements of enforceability. The point here is that
success in fashioning clear formal rules that guide communities
whose members rely on legal enforcement will necessarily generate
a pattern in which the cases that end up in the reports are those
involving relationships where legal enforcement is not important
and where by definition the parties have failed to comply as they
should have.
Even were they found in some sample, numerous cases involving
strained interpretations of section 2-201 to ensure that its formal
writing requirement does not apply would not constitute a satisfac-
tory argument for abolition of the statutory formality. The real
question is whether abolition of the Statute to conform to these
cases will erode the norm of written contracts in communities
dependent upon legal enforcement. Here, the evidence indicates
that contracts are put in writing for two reasons-to secure legal
enforceability and to clarify what is to be expected as performance
... See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of America v. Tribune Co., 670 F. Supp. 491
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that commitment letter represented a binding preliminary
commitment and obligated both parties to conclude loan agreement upon agreed
terms by negotiating in good faith).
"' See R.G. Group, Inc. v. Horn & Hardart Co., 751 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1984);
Consarc Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 996 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1993).
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proceeds. Regardless, however, of the magnitude of the perceived
probability that legal enforcement will be necessary, the level of
detail in the parties' written agreement should be greater the more
complex the transaction. This assumption implies that it is only in
relatively simple transactions where legal enforceability is an ex ante
need that the level of written contractual detail will be strongly
affected by the presence or absence of statutory requirements.
Hence, abolition of the Statute would tend to undermine the use of
a detailed writing in relatively simple transactions, leading to greater
cost and uncertainty in the resolution of disputes arising out of such
transactions. The ultimate issue would then be whether such a cost
is justified by the benefit that is realized when the posited tortured
applications of the Statute are avoided. My sample indicates that
however tortured the reasoning may be, there is little uncertainty
that judges will find a way around the Statute of Frauds when
confronted by an informal but actual agreement between parties in
a continuing relationship. On this view, the balance clearly tips in
favor of retaining the Statute.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix contains a table listing all thirty cases in the base
sample and the coding used for the statistical analysis. It also
contains some information on coding reliability measures.
A. The Coding
For purposes of both textual discussion and statistical analysis,
the coding given in Table Three below was determinative.
TABLE 3
Case Coding
Case Prior Writings Statute of Endgame Complexity
Name Dealings Frauds
Issue
Akrosil no yes sufficiency NA high
Well yes yes ct raised; yes moderate
Water writing,
sufficiency
McCulley no no exception NA simple
(brokered)
Buffaloe yes no exception transac- simple
tion type
Atlantic yes no exception yes moderate
Box (merger,
acquisi-
tion)
Gasmark § 2-201 not even cited
Nucor no yes no NA moderate
exception;
sufficiency
Hurwitz yes no statute yes high
inapplica-
ble
Axeson not a live § 2-201 issue
Jones no yes no NA moderate
merchant
exception
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Case Prior Writings Statute of Eudgame Complexity
Name Dealings Frauds
Issue
Beal not a live § 2-201 issue
Kirkpatrick not a live § 2-201 issue
Dixon no yes sufficiency NA moderate
(marginal
issue)
Champion no yes sufficiency NA moderate
Turf (merchant
I exception)
Ryan no yes sufficiency NA high
MSR no yes marginal yes, bkrtcy high
Explora- issue
lion
Christensen social net- yes exception unclear moderate
work, (sketchy)
dyadic ?
Magallanes no (bro- yes (telex, exception NA moderate
kered) then writ- (marginal
ing) argument)
Figueroa no yes exception NA high
(marginal
issue)
In Re Uni- yes yes exception bkrtcy moderate
Products
Baker no yes no yes (seller moderate
Hughes exception; out of
writings business)
inadequate
In Re no yes no yes moderate
Atkins exception; (install-
writing ment)
inadequate
American yes yes marginal yes high (war-
Dredging ranty)
In Re yes no exception bkrtcy high
Alper- found
Richman I I I
rsy-r Inot live § 2-201 issue
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Case Prior Writings Statute of Endgame Complexity
Name Dealings Frauds
Issue
First no yes sufficient, bkrtcy moderate
Valley if not, an
exception
Dawkins yes no merchant yes (son simple
exception taking
I over)
Brochsteins not live § 2-201 issue
The no no (not application ? moderate
Stanley on prom- of statute
ise
alleged)
D.A. Ella yes (sub/ no exception moderate
general) (written (promis-
confirm.) sory
I estoppel) I
American (same case as above)
Dredging
Note: "NA" means not applicable.
B. Coding Reliability Measures
As a test on the reliability of the author's coding, a large subset
(18 of 23) of the cases were coded by at least three and (on some
issues) four individual coders, working completely independently.
The case coding sheet is available from the author upon request.
The basic coding consistency results-simple correlations-are given
in Table Four below.
From Carmines and Zeller,15 we have at least two candidate
tests of measurement consistency across coders. One of these is the
average correlation between coder responses for a single item. The
other, Cronbach's Alpha, adjusts average correlation for the
number, N, of coders. If we let p denote the arithmetic average
correlation, then Cronbach's Alpha, denoted by a, is given by:
a = Np/[1 + p(N-1)].
153 See CARMINES & ZELLER, supra note 123, at 32-35, 43-47.
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For the PRIORD variable, the average correlation is 0.642, and
a = 0.87. For the COMPLEXITY variable, the average correlation
is 0.75, and a = 0.923. For the WRITE variable, each index is a
perfect 1.0. All of these tests are well within the conventional range
of acceptability.
TABLE 4
Case Coding Consistency Data
Case Name PRIORD WRITE COMPLEXITY
Buffaloe 4/4 yes 100% on all 4/4 simple
Atlantic Box 4/4 yes (3 simple,
1 mod.)
Jones 4/4 no (3 simple,
I mod.)
Beal 3/4 said not § 2-201
Kirkpatrick 3/4 said not § 2-201
Dixon 2 no, 2 yes (2 mod.,
2 simple)
Champion Turf 3 no, 1 yes (2 mod.,
2 simple)
Ryan 2 no, 1 yes, 1 not 3 high
§ 2-201
MSR Exploration 2 not § 2-201, 2 high,
2 no 2 mod.
Christensen 2 unclear, 1 yes, 2 simple,
1 no 2 mod.
Magallanes 2 said not 2 mod.
§ 2-201, 2 no
Figueroa 1 not § 2-201, 3 high
3 no
In Re Uni- 3 yes, 1 no 4 mod.
Products
Baker Hughes 2 yes, 2 no 3 mod.,
1 simple
In Re Atkins 4/4 no 3 simple,
1 mod.
1911
1912 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1859
Case Name PRIOR]) WRITE COMPLEXrTY
American 2 said not 1 high,
Dredging § 2-201, 1 yes, 1 simple
1 no
In Re Alper 2 said not 3 high
Richman § 2-201, 2 yes
Syrovy 3/4 said not § 2-201
First Valley 4/4 no 4/4 mod.
Dawkins 4/4 yes 4/4 simple
Brochsteins 3/4 not § 2-201
The Stanley 2 yes, 2 no 3 mod.
D.A. Elia 2 said not 2/2 mod.
§ 2-201; 1 yes,
1 no
